1 June 2026
In common with any other form of litigation, actions taken over probate must comply with the Statute of Limitation, 1957. Probate claims must be taken within 12 years to recover land or personal estate, from the date of death of the deceased. For claims against a deceased personal estate, claims must be taken within six years. For children (under section 117), claims must be taken with six months of the grant of probate. A recent case came before the High Court to determine a preliminary issue on whether the plaintiff’s claim was statute-barred by reason of s. 45 of the Statute of Limitations, 1957. The deceased, Bridget Doyle, died on 19 August 2016, aged 83. She was survived by one son (the plaintiff) and six daughters, two of which were her personal representatives and the defendants. The Grant of Probate in the estate was issued on 8 October 2019 and the plaintiff issued proceedings on 1 February 2025. The plaintiff in his action sought to compel the defendants to distribute the estate in accordance with what the plaintiff claimed is the true interpretation of the deceased’s Will. But in this case, the court confined itself to a preliminary point on whether the plaintiff was within the Statute of Limitation in issuing proceedings. The defendants contended that the six-year was breached as the period runs from the date of death of the deceased and that proceedings should be dismissed. The court first considered the Relevant Limitation Period. Section 45 of the Statute of Limitations, 1957, as inserted by s. 126 of the Succession Act, 1965, provides: “(1) Subject to section 71, no action in respect of any claim to the estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in such estate, whether under a will, on intestacy or under section 111 or section 111A of the Succession Act, 1965, shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date when the right to receive the share or interest accrued.” The effect of the changes brought about by the Succession Act, 1965, in applying a limitation period to claims by beneficiaries against personal representatives, even though they are trustees of the estate for those entitled, is tempered by s. 71 of the Statute, which provides for an extension of the limitation period in s. 45 in certain circumstances. Section 71 of the Statute, which provides: “(1) Where, in the case of an action for which a period of limitation is fixed by this Act, either— (a) the action is based on the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent, or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall enable an action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed.” The judge pointed out that section 71 does not operate, in this case, to prevent the plaintiff’s claim becoming statute barred. In this particular case, the judge observed that the Will was ambiguous and that it was clear from the correspondence that the plaintiff had a copy of the Will and was asserting his interpretation of it by early 2018, which is approximately seven years before the institution of the within proceedings. Also, the defendants were asserting a contrary interpretation and did not intend to bring a construction summons. Consequently, the court noted that even if it could be said that the limitation period may have been extended by s. 71 for a time, that is, until the personal representatives furnished the plaintiff with a copy of the Will, the time had obviously begun to run by early 2018. As that was more than six years before proceedings were instituted, s. 71 cannot avail the plaintiff in this case. The defendants asserted that the time ran from the date the deceased died. The judge consulted caselaw on the issue of the limitation period. The next point the judge considered was when did the right to receive the bequest accrue? The judge pointed out that Section 45 (1) provides that the six-year limitation period commences on “the date when the right to receive the share or interest accrued” and, therefore, the outcome of this preliminary issue depends on the correct interpretation of that phrase. The judge reviewed case law on this point but found no judicial consideration of when the “right to receive” a bequest of real property under a Will accrues. To assist the judge looked at some UK caselaw and while no binding here, they can be influential in the absence of Irish case law. Thus in considering the caselaw the judge said ‘The answer to the question must be that the real property in question vests in the executors named in the Will and they hold it “as trustees” in the sense that they must duly administer the estate in accordance with law and, once they are satisfied that the property in question is not required to discharge any costs, expenses, liabilities or claims, they are then obliged to transfer it to the person entitled thereto under the Will’. The judge said there must be time allowed for due administration, so it cannot be said that the ‘right to receive the bequest’ cannot follow immediately on death of the deceased. The judge next considered ‘Time allowed for due administration of an estate.’ In general, a year is allowed for an executor to identify, assemble the assets and liabilities of an estate. There will be exceptions to this in complex Wills but in straight-forward Wills a year should be sufficient. The judge consulted case law on this. The judge found that there was nothing to suggest in this case to fall outside the one-year period. In summing up this case the key issue in determining the net point on the Statute of Limitations centred around the ‘right to receive.’ The judge said: I find it difficult to see how there can be a “right to receive” when there remains the possibility of a claim which might require the personal representatives to refrain from distribution so as to meet that claim. On the facts of this case, that time seems not to have expired until six months after the grant issued. The plaintiff sued less than six years from the expiry of that six-month period (and indeed less than six years after the issue of the Grant), and therefore, it cannot be said that he is statute-barred by reason of section 45. Consequently, the plaintiff was not statute barred from taking his case. Frank Doyle v Anne Doyle and Bridget Goodwin Doyle High Court (Ms Justice Stack) 29 April 2026 [2026] IEHC 285.