The plaintiff issued defamatory proceedings in August 2023 regarding an allegedly defamatory statement by the second-named defendant, seeking damages (including aggravated and punitive damages) for defamation in respect of a phone conversation in July 2023.
There had been a previous incident in August 2021 involving a series of emails sent by first-named defendant to the CEO and Head of Fundraising at the Jack and Jill Foundation. The plaintiff had been a voluntary board member of the Jack and Jill Foundation since 2018.
The plaintiff applied to the court pursuant to section 11(2) (c) of the Statute of Limitations, 1957 (as amended) to extend the time from one-year to enable the plaintiff to bring in the earlier allegedly defamatory statements.
The plaintiff explained in her application that she delayed in issuing proceedings as she did not want to cause trouble for the charity when it was struggling due to issues caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. She also said that home-schooling her three young children during the pandemic had the result that the statements made by the defendants did not receive the consideration they perhaps deserved.
Additionally, another question arose from the plaintiff’s application being, as to whether or not in the event that the application was unsuccessful, the plaintiff would seek to rely on the August 2021 publications in support of the plea that the publication in July 2023 was made maliciously.
The High Court judge considered the case law for extending the time limit. In Quinn v Reserve Defence Force Representative Association [2018] IEHC 684 the statutory test was set out. The judge was cognisant that the jurisdiction to extent time in defamation cases only applied in exceptional cases.
In the Quinn case it was observed that the court is required “to carry out a qualitive assessment of the reason or reasons proffered for the delay. This involves a consideration of the quality and nature of the reason or reasons advanced and a weighing of the respective prejudices.”
In another case, he noted Joyce v Mayo Travellers Support Group [2023] IEHC 84 as authority to the effect that in considering the nature of the case, the court should assume that the plaintiff will be successful.
The judge was not satisfied that the reasons given by the plaintiff were particularly cogent or persuasive, finding that “even on their own terms either separately or together or when considered in the round, they are unimpressive reasons”.
The judge also stated that he was unconvinced that the plaintiff suffered a type of psychological paralysis by virtue of the August 2021 allegedly defamatory statements and that only by July 2023 had the plaintiff recovered her courage enough to issue proceedings.
The judge also considered whether because of delay by the plaintiff whether such evidence was available. He raised this because the second defendant claimed that he could not remember the phone call made in August 2021, and the judge found that entirely plausible.
Another consideration the court had to factor in was whether it was in the interests of justice in extending the time and whether if refused would that prejudice the plaintiff.
Decision
The prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the refusal of the application would not significantly outweigh that of the defendants should time be extended in circumstances where the defendants would be obliged “to defend a claim concerning publications in August 2021 issued well out of time and the detail of which was only notified to them in 2024”.
Accordingly, the High Court refused the application to extend the time.
Catherine Logan v Peter Wilson and David Godwin [2025] IEHC 284.

