The petitioner who is a director and shareholder in software company Sulu Software Consultancy Ltd, sought to wind up the company pursuant to the Companies Act, 2014, section 569 (1) (e) on the grounds that the Company has, due to a breakdown in the relationship with one of the founders, essentially ceased to function and is on the cusp of insolvency. The respondent objected to the application to wind up the company. He was also a director of the Company and, at the time the petition was presented, a shareholder, holding just over 25% of the issued share capital of the Company. At the time the application to the court was made, the company was on the brink of insolvency, with no employees and very little activity happening. The application to the court was for the court to exercise its discretion on the ‘just and equitable’ ground on arguments put forward by the respondent. The grounds put forward by the respondent were: (i) The petitioner had organised the acquisition of the respondents shares in the company after the respondent had resigned. (ii) The petitioner was part of a plan to remove the non-compete clauses from the contracts of employment of key staff, which was proposed and supported by all the shareholders, except for the respondent; and (iii) The petitioner had started to work on a new startup company which did not include the respondent. Also, the respondent urged that the real purpose of the petition was to frustrate his proposed Oppression Proceedings and the Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the winding-up petition in all the circumstances. The petitioner and respondent were founders of the company which was to design software to help companies leverage the benefits of using crypto currency and associated technology. There was no dispute that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship between the respondent and the company. Both parties agreed that the company was on the brink of insolvency. The petitioner explained to the court that the company was a start-up with start-up funding which was virtually gone and the Oppression Proceedings by the respondent made it almost impossible to attract new investment. As a result of that, the company passed a resolution supported by all of the shareholders except the respondent, releasing all of the founders, including the respondent, from their non-compete clauses. The Board Minutes in respect of that decision indicated that it arose in “consideration of the financial position and poor future prospects of the Company.” The court considered the legislative provisions under the Companies Act, 2014 and relevant case law. Very extensive submissions were made by both sides and in considering these together with the legislation and case law, the court was satisfied that the appropriate exercise of the court's discretion was to accede to the petition and to make an order for the winding up of the Company and the appointment of the liquidator. Having considered the factual context and having taken account of the submissions made, the court ruled that it was just and equitable that the company be wound up. Mr Justice Quinn said: ‘The principal reason for this is the undisputed fact that the company is on the cusp of insolvency and has literally only months to go before it runs out of funds and there is no plausible prospect of this not occurring. No solution has been identified that will enable the Company to avoid an imminent insolvency. As Collins J. says in Re Lanskey Ltd. [2022] IECA 34 “there was no adequate or satisfactory alternative remedy here”. To refuse the petition would be to create an unsatisfactory situation. The Company has currently no employees and is carrying on minimal activity. In a few months, the Company will be insolvent with no cash or other assets, and it will be difficult, from a practical point of view, for any liquidator to carry out the functions necessary to wind up the Company properly.’ The judge observed that without investment the company could not fulfil the purpose for which it was created. In all the circumstances, the court found that it was just and equitable to have the company wound up. O’Neill (petitioner) v Hudner (respondent) High Court [2025] IEHC 669.

KBC bank sold on a loan to Pepper Finance after it started possession proceedings against the borrower. But did Pepper follow the correct procedures in setting itself up as the new plaintiff? Borrowers in recent years became used to receiving letters from their lender informing them that their loans have been acquired by a new entity to whom they should make future payments. A common term for these new entities is vulture funds and they are not slow in taking action against defaulting borrowers through the courts. However, sometimes the new vulture fund might purchase a loan book some time after the vendor/bank had actually issued proceedings against the borrower and even obtained judgement. A borrower was entitled to appeal a possession judgment to the High Court but in that case, it became necessary for the new vulture fund to have itself substituted, as it were, for the original bank plaintiff in the appeal proceedings. A recent case in the High Court highlighted that there was some legal uncertainty about the exact procedures for inserting the new vulture fund plaintiff in such proceedings and the judge remitted the issue on to the Court of Appeal for them to determine. If the new plaintiff was incorrectly inserted into the proceedings, it followed that any resultant orders could be challenged and maybe null and void. Historically, the vulture funds had applied to the courts to have themselves substituted as a new plaintiff in place of the old bank plaintiff. However, the judge queried this and quoted an earlier high court case IRBC v Halpin which suggested that in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the correct order to be made (where a transfer of loan has occurred between the Circuit Court case and the hearing of an appeal) is that the new vulture fund transferee be joined as an additional party to the appeal proceedings as a second plaintiff rather than merely stepping into the shoes of or being substituted for the original plaintiff. A substitution order made midway through an appeal has the effect the judge said of appearing to give retrospective judgement to the newly added party and that would not be correct. He therefore sent the issue of the precise form a change of party application should take on to the Court of Appeal to determine Pepper Finance Corporation Ireland DAC v Treacey O’Neill [2024] IEHC 742

A passenger on a boat that encountered a rough sea crossing sued Irish Ferries for the trauma she suffered from the experience. The plaintiff, Susan Burt, described the sea journey as a ‘hideous and harrowing experience,’ on the sea crossing. She told the court that she thought that she was going to die when the boat was tossed around. At one point the boat lurched to an angle of 33 degrees during Storm Imogen about 10 years ago when the boat was sailing between Cherbourg and Dublin. The court was told that conditions were so bad that the boat could not drop anchor or risk docking anywhere. Instead, it had to sail back and forth for 18 hours in what coastal shelter it could find until the storm eased. The court was told that passengers were screaming with the extreme sailing conditions. Items were dismantled and flying through the air, dishes were smashing, furniture was sliding up and down decks and cabin floors and when the ship rolled, passengers had to crawl on all fours to get around. The plaintiff thought, as did others, that the ship might capsize. Previous claims by some passengers were settled for between €14,500 and €23,000 for what they endured and some of these were awarded to children. His Honour Judge Callan considered the mental trauma suffered by the plaintiff in considering the level of damages. He noted that the plaintiff had not reached the threshold of having suffered PTSD according to psychiatric reports though she had been exposed to sustained and continuous shock, an experience that she should not have had to endure. Considering all the facts, the judge awarded €17,500 in damages to the plaintiff. The case was taken in the Circuit Court and as the award was below the threshold for damages in that court, the barrister for Irish Ferries asked the court to award legal costs on the District Court scale. The judge declined and awarded costs on the Circuit Court scale because the proceedings had been ongoing for a considerable time and the court was impressed with the evidence of the plaintiff. Susan Burt v Irish Ferries Circuit Civil Court (His Hon. Judge Chris Callan) 27 June 2025.

Following an accident, you should equip your solicitor with all documents and details necessary for him to get an overview of the facts and decide as to who is liable for the accident. He/she will then be able to commence a claim on your behalf. Do I have to go to the PIAB? You are obliged to engage with the Injuries Board in most personal injury cases but, in medical negligence cases, you can bypass the Injuries Board and issue proceedings directly in the courts. You have two years to initiate such proceedings, and this time limit is a strict one unless you only realised you had an injury or condition (caused by medical negligence) outside the two-year time limit. Settlement or court hearing? Most claims, even after proceedings are well underway, are settled out of court and without any need to go to trial. Some cases, (perhaps those lacking in merit) will be fully defended by the insurance company and are more likely, following the breakdown of settlement discussions to end up in a full court hearing. What happens in the courtroom itself? Your team, as plaintiff, will start off outlining the case to the judge and the other side, the defendant/insurance company, will have a right of reply. The judge will hear evidence from the plaintiff and the medical expert opinion witnesses. Again, the defendant can challenge some of their comments by way of cross-examination and produce their own expert independent witnesses. The judge then sums up and largely based on the medical reports, will find in favour of the plaintiff or defendant as the case may. I am a somewhat nervous person. Do I have to spend lots of time in court describing my injuries? No. You will not spend hours in the witness box describing your medical injuries as your medical witnesses will do this for you. You will merely be asked to say that you were unwell and therefore relied on your surgeon/GP/physician to treat you properly and adequately. Do I have to agree to go to mediation as I really want my day in court? The short answer is no but you would be well advised to consider mediation as an alternative to court hearings which will be more daunting and expensive. For some years the courts have tried to encourage all parties in the more complex personal injury actions to consider going to mediation. Quite recently the courts issued a practice direction bracket (HC131) to all legal practitioners whereby the plaintiff’s team must formally offer mediation to the opposing party within three weeks of obtaining a trial date and agree to engage in that mediation process within six weeks of their offer being accepted.

The plaintiff’s car was rear-ended in a motor accident at traffic lights where the defendant insurer had accepted liability. The accident occurred in December 2017. Her case came before the High Court on an assessment-only basis. However, a question arose as to whether the defendant could be held liable for PTSD which was alleged to have resulted from the accident. If that was the case, then to what extent to which the plaintiff’s ongoing physical and psychological symptoms were properly referable to the accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was wearing her seat belt, but the air bags did not deploy. Later that day, she felt unwell and attended CareDoc. From here she was referred to hospital where she was diagnosed with soft tissue issues to her neck, shoulder and right arm. The plaintiff claimed that she took seven weeks’ sick leave from her job but on her return, she claimed that she found it difficult because of her injuries. She also claimed that she suffered anxiety, flashbacks and had difficulty sleeping. At the end of December 2021 her employment was terminated and from September 2022 she started to receive an invalidity pension. She has not worked since, and she and her daughter became homeless in March 2023. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had some personal difficulties. Her parents died and she had to take medication to cope with difficulties she had with a work colleague. However, she accepted that at the time of the accident she was not experiencing any mental health issues. The defendant insurer had accepted liability. However, a question arose as to whether the defendant could be held liable for PTSD alleged to have resulted from the accident and if so, the extent to which the plaintiff’s ongoing physical and psychological symptoms were properly referable to the accident. It was submitted by the defendant that the accident was not the cause of the plaintiff’s mental health. The defendant argued that the accident was not causative of the plaintiff’s mental health problems and that same were in existence at the time of the accident, relying on the fact that the claim was introduced very belatedly into the plaintiff’s case and that she improperly failed to disclose relevant prior mental health history until shortly before the hearing. The judge was not impressed with the plaintiff’s failure to disclose her prior mental health issues and that she was inclined to overstate her symptoms. However, the judge noted that: “even allowing for a margin of exaggeration by the plaintiff of her symptoms”, he was satisfied from the medical evidence tendered that the plaintiff was no longer suffering from anxiety and depression at the time of the accident. The judge commented that the plaintiff was a poor candidate for the accident because of her psychological vulnerability, the “eggshell skull” rule required the defendant to take the plaintiff as he found her. Nervous shock was considered in light of Kelly v Hennessy [1995] 3 IR 253, and the judge was satisfied that the plaintiff met its requirements. The judge explained that some sort of injury was foreseeable arising from the accident. With causation established, the plaintiff would not have suffered symptoms consistent with PTSD from January 2018 onwards but for the accident, but that a range of external factors not properly referable to the accident contributed to the length and severity of her mental health symptoms. In other words, the external facts were a consideration of the plaintiff’s mental heal but not directly caused by the car accident. Accordingly, the court concluded that damages would fall to be assessed on the basis that 50% of the plaintiff’s psychiatric symptoms in the period from the accident to trial were attributable to the accident itself. Having regard to the relevant case law on the principles applying to awards of damages in personal injuries cases and on the approach to multiple injuries cases, the judge determined that the plaintiff’s psychiatric injury was the most significant and assessed damages on a “pre-Guidelines basis” at €50,000 for past suffering and €10,000 for future suffering. Having discounted that figure to €30,000 to take into account the contributing and exacerbating external factors not attributable to the accident, the court uplifted that figure by €35,000 for the plaintiff’s neck, shoulder and back injuries. Therefore, the High Court awarded the plaintiff €65,000 in general damages, together with special damages and loss of earnings already agreed at €25,000. Sykula v O’Reilly [2025] IEHC 638.

A case came before the High Court where it appeared that an alteration was made to a Will after it had been executed. The deceased man had died, leaving four siblings as he had never married and had no children. In his Will dated 29 April 1981, he left a valuable property in Dublin to one of his brothers, Eamonn. A later alteration to the Will replaced the bequest of the property to his brother, Eamon with a bequest of IR €1 (pound). Another brother of the deceased, Malachy sought an order of the court for a grant of probate and an order declaring that the Will was duly executed. The judge noted that if the attempted obliteration of the bequest was found to be valid and effective, the deceased’s three surviving siblings and the children of a sibling who predeceased the testator would be entitled to shares of the property. The judge was satisfied that the Will was correctly executed and, having done so, now needed to address the part of the Will that bequeathed the property to one of the deceased’s brothers. The judge considered section 86 of the 1965 Act which invalidates obliterations, interlineations or alterations to a Will if made after execution unless they are executed in like manner as the will itself, the court highlighted: “This is so even if the words are not only no longer ‘apparent’ but cannot be deciphered even with the aid of infrared technology. A conundrum can therefore arise if there is an invalid obliteration of part of a Will and it is not possible, even with the aid of technology, to decipher what the terms of the will are.” The judge found that in circumstances where the obliterated words in the deceased’s Will were still legible, “it is clear that this Will has not been partially revoked so as to remove the bequest in favour of Eamonn” and that there was no evidence whatsoever to support any finding of an intention to revoke that part of the Will. The judge pointed out that if the changes were made prior to the Will being executed, then that would be fine. It was submitted to the court that the deceased’s brother Tom came into possession of the Will on a date prior to August 2009 and that the applicant came into possession of the will on 12 August 2009 and accepted that the Will had not been opened or altered between 12 August 2009 and the date of the deceased’s death. However, the judge noted that that left a gap of 28 years wherein an alteration to the Will could have been made. The judge was of the opinion that it was more likely that the change of heart came after execution of the Will, noting that it could not be said whether the attempted obliteration and alterations were done by the testator in any event as there was no acknowledgment of the changes by him or by any witnesses and so section 86 had not been complied with. Therefore, the High Court ruled the changes made to the Will in respect of the property to be invalid and admitted the Will to probate so as to include the words “160 S.C. Road, Dublin” and determined that the characters “£1-00” would be excluded from the Will as their insertion was not validly and effectively done. In the matter of the Estate of Michael Joseph McNally [2025] IEHC 299.

A seven-year-old girl received a settlement for a horse bite while she was attending Bunratty Castle and Folk Park in with her parents when she was eighteen months old. A proposed settlement of €15,000 was submitted to the court for approval. The horse bit the toddler on the wrist and elbow on her left arm during a family visit to Bunratty Folk Park. Her injuries, the judge added, were "not severe". Liability was not contested. The barrister for the child said that her client had the benefit of a medical report and a psychiatric assessment from consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist, Dr Eithne Foley. Counsel said that the medical evidence shows the physical sequelae resolved very quickly and it was the psychological and psychiatric issues that led the plaintiff to be advised to attend for play therapy. Counsel said that the child attended 12 sessions of play therapy, “and she seems to have medically made a full recovery’’ . The medical reports said the girl is a happy child with no functional impairment and has made a full recovery. The accident though, had been very upsetting for the child. Judge Comerford approved of the settlement figure noting that it was always better that someone makes a complete recovery, though the awards are less. He also noted that reports prepared for the court indicate the girl is doing very well socially and academically. He awarded Circuit Court costs to the girl, and he directed that the sum of €15,000 be paid into court and held there for the benefit of the girl until she reaches the age of 18. Infant (Suing by her Mother) v Bunratty Castle and Folk Park (His Hon. Francis Comerford) Ennis Circuit Court 8 October 2025.

Christopher Furlong was a machine operator with the defendant who worked at their Walkinstown factory. He worked there for eleven years. The case was brought by his daughter as the plaintiff had since died. The plaintiff claimed that Mr Furlong was continually exposed to asbestos at his place of work. The court was told that spots were found on Mr Furlong’s lungs during a scan in July 2020 and terminal cancer was diagnosed in September 2020. In May 2021, Mr Furlong died. It was submitted to the court that during the course of his employment, Mr Furlong was continuously exposed to asbestos material resulting in him sustaining severe personal injuries, leading to his death on May 30th, 2021. It was further submitted that Mr Furlong had been exposed to a risk of injury which the company knew or ought to have known, and there was an alleged failure to take any adequate precautions for his safety while he was engaged in his work in the premises at Walkinstown. Additionally, it was also claimed there was a failure to carry out any adequate tests or inspections of the premises to determine the level of asbestos allegedly there. The defendant, Smurfit Kappa denied all the claims and contended if Mr Furlong had suffered any alleged personal injury, it was not foreseeable or preventable. They also submitted to the court that Mr Furlong had exposed himself to the risk by virtue of the fact that he was a cigarette smoker. Liability in the case was disputed especially in relation to trying to establish what happened over 50 years ago. However, both parties reached a settlement which was read to the court and met with the approval of Mr Justice Coffey of a total figure of €150,000 for the plaintiff. McCann v Smurfit Kappa Group High Court (Mr. Justice Coffey) July 2024.

Italian clothing company Diesel SpA disputed the right to use the trademark, ‘Diesel’ by Irish company Montex Holdings Ltd in a long-running case. The Italian company sold jeans and other items in Ireland since 1982. The Irish company Montex’s predecessor had used this trademark since 1979, and in September 1992, Montex applied to the Controller of Patents, Designs and Trademarks to register the word ‘Diesel’ for their jeans. Diesel raised their objection to Montex in January 1994 and sought to register the name Diesel for their own company. They claimed that there would be confusion in the market if Montex had the use of the same name. In 1998, Montex’s application was declined as it had failed to establish that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion with Diesel’s offerings, thus failing to meet the requirements of the Trademarks Act 1963 . Montex appealed to the High Court but failed. They failed again in the Supreme Court. But in 2013, the Controller upheld Montex’s opposition to Diesel’s trademark applications. The Controller ruled that Diesel was not the proprietor of the trademark and that there would be confusion if Diesel’s mark was allowed on the register. Diesel appealed this ruling to the High Court where it was successful. The High Court judge found that Diesel was the proprietor of the marks accepting that confusion would arise if Montex also appeared on the register as owner of the same mark. Montex appealed against the High Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal. They based their appeal on a number of points including that the issue of proprietorship was res judicata (the matter cannot be raised again) having regard to the earlier decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court. They also submitted that the High Court erred in finding that the issue of Montex’s bona fide use of the trademark was not conclusively decided in the earlier proceedings and erred in allowing new evidence on that issue. The Court of Appeal considered the judgments given previously in this case. In regard to the res judicata issue, this required the High Court judge to find that Montex was the proprietor of the mark, a matter which had been decided in Montex’s favour initially in the High Court and which had been accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal declined to consider further questions of alleged copying or wrongful conduct by Montex and the effect of same on Diesel’s application for registration on the basis that their determination was unnecessary, given that the Supreme Court had unequivocally concluded that confusion within the meaning of s.19 of the 1963 Act “prevents registration, irrespective of whether there is blameworthy conduct or not” . The Court of Appeal determined that it was not open to the High Court to permit registration of Diesel’s mark on the basis of Montex’s conduct or blameworthiness, where same was irrelevant to the application of s.19. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of Montex. Diesel SpA v The Controller of Patents, Designs and Trademarks and Montex Holdings Ltd [2025] IECA 211