Christopher Furlong was a machine operator with the defendant who worked at their Walkinstown factory. He worked there for eleven years. The case was brought by his daughter as the plaintiff had since died. The plaintiff claimed that Mr Furlong was continually exposed to asbestos at his place of work. The court was told that spots were found on Mr Furlong’s lungs during a scan in July 2020 and terminal cancer was diagnosed in September 2020. In May 2021, Mr Furlong died. It was submitted to the court that during the course of his employment, Mr Furlong was continuously exposed to asbestos material resulting in him sustaining severe personal injuries, leading to his death on May 30th, 2021. It was further submitted that Mr Furlong had been exposed to a risk of injury which the company knew or ought to have known, and there was an alleged failure to take any adequate precautions for his safety while he was engaged in his work in the premises at Walkinstown. Additionally, it was also claimed there was a failure to carry out any adequate tests or inspections of the premises to determine the level of asbestos allegedly there. The defendant, Smurfit Kappa denied all the claims and contended if Mr Furlong had suffered any alleged personal injury, it was not foreseeable or preventable. They also submitted to the court that Mr Furlong had exposed himself to the risk by virtue of the fact that he was a cigarette smoker. Liability in the case was disputed especially in relation to trying to establish what happened over 50 years ago. However, both parties reached a settlement which was read to the court and met with the approval of Mr Justice Coffey of a total figure of €150,000 for the plaintiff. McCann v Smurfit Kappa Group High Court (Mr. Justice Coffey) July 2024.

Italian clothing company Diesel SpA disputed the right to use the trademark, ‘Diesel’ by Irish company Montex Holdings Ltd in a long-running case. The Italian company sold jeans and other items in Ireland since 1982. The Irish company Montex’s predecessor had used this trademark since 1979, and in September 1992, Montex applied to the Controller of Patents, Designs and Trademarks to register the word ‘Diesel’ for their jeans. Diesel raised their objection to Montex in January 1994 and sought to register the name Diesel for their own company. They claimed that there would be confusion in the market if Montex had the use of the same name. In 1998, Montex’s application was declined as it had failed to establish that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion with Diesel’s offerings, thus failing to meet the requirements of the Trademarks Act 1963 . Montex appealed to the High Court but failed. They failed again in the Supreme Court. But in 2013, the Controller upheld Montex’s opposition to Diesel’s trademark applications. The Controller ruled that Diesel was not the proprietor of the trademark and that there would be confusion if Diesel’s mark was allowed on the register. Diesel appealed this ruling to the High Court where it was successful. The High Court judge found that Diesel was the proprietor of the marks accepting that confusion would arise if Montex also appeared on the register as owner of the same mark. Montex appealed against the High Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal. They based their appeal on a number of points including that the issue of proprietorship was res judicata (the matter cannot be raised again) having regard to the earlier decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court. They also submitted that the High Court erred in finding that the issue of Montex’s bona fide use of the trademark was not conclusively decided in the earlier proceedings and erred in allowing new evidence on that issue. The Court of Appeal considered the judgments given previously in this case. In regard to the res judicata issue, this required the High Court judge to find that Montex was the proprietor of the mark, a matter which had been decided in Montex’s favour initially in the High Court and which had been accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal declined to consider further questions of alleged copying or wrongful conduct by Montex and the effect of same on Diesel’s application for registration on the basis that their determination was unnecessary, given that the Supreme Court had unequivocally concluded that confusion within the meaning of s.19 of the 1963 Act “prevents registration, irrespective of whether there is blameworthy conduct or not” . The Court of Appeal determined that it was not open to the High Court to permit registration of Diesel’s mark on the basis of Montex’s conduct or blameworthiness, where same was irrelevant to the application of s.19. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of Montex. Diesel SpA v The Controller of Patents, Designs and Trademarks and Montex Holdings Ltd [2025] IECA 211

A case came before the High Court where it appeared that an alteration was made to a Will after it had been executed. The deceased man had died, leaving four siblings as he had never married and had no children. In his Will dated 29 April 1981, he left a valuable property in Dublin to one of his brothers, Eamonn. A later alteration to the Will replaced the bequest of the property to his brother, Eamon with a bequest of IR €1 (pound). Another brother of the deceased, Malachy sought an order of the court for a grant of probate and an order declaring that the Will was duly executed. The judge noted that if the attempted obliteration of the bequest was found to be valid and effective, the deceased’s three surviving siblings and the children of a sibling who predeceased the testator would be entitled to shares of the property. The judge was satisfied that the Will was correctly executed and, having done so, now needed to address the part of the Will that bequeathed the property to one of the deceased’s brothers. The judge considered section 86 of the 1965 Act which invalidates obliterations, interlineations or alterations to a Will if made after execution unless they are executed in like manner as the will itself, the court highlighted: “This is so even if the words are not only no longer ‘apparent’ but cannot be deciphered even with the aid of infrared technology. A conundrum can therefore arise if there is an invalid obliteration of part of a Will and it is not possible, even with the aid of technology, to decipher what the terms of the will are.” The judge found that in circumstances where the obliterated words in the deceased’s Will were still legible, “it is clear that this Will has not been partially revoked so as to remove the bequest in favour of Eamonn” and that there was no evidence whatsoever to support any finding of an intention to revoke that part of the Will. The judge pointed out that if the changes were made prior to the Will being executed, then that would be fine. It was submitted to the court that the deceased’s brother Tom came into possession of the Will on a date prior to August 2009 and that the applicant came into possession of the will on 12 August 2009 and accepted that the Will had not been opened or altered between 12 August 2009 and the date of the deceased’s death. However, the judge noted that that left a gap of 28 years wherein an alteration to the Will could have been made. The judge was of the opinion that it was more likely that the change of heart came after execution of the Will, noting that it could not be said whether the attempted obliteration and alterations were done by the testator in any event as there was no acknowledgment of the changes by him or by any witnesses and so section 86 had not been complied with. Therefore, the High Court ruled the changes made to the Will in respect of the property to be invalid and admitted the Will to probate so as to include the words “160 S.C. Road, Dublin” and determined that the characters “£1-00” would be excluded from the Will as their insertion was not validly and effectively done. In the matter of the Estate of Michael Joseph McNally [2025] IEHC 299.

A seven-year-old girl received a settlement for a horse bite while she was attending Bunratty Castle and Folk Park in with her parents when she was eighteen months old. A proposed settlement of €15,000 was submitted to the court for approval. The horse bit the toddler on the wrist and elbow on her left arm during a family visit to Bunratty Folk Park. Her injuries, the judge added, were "not severe". Liability was not contested. The barrister for the child said that her client had the benefit of a medical report and a psychiatric assessment from consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist, Dr Eithne Foley. Counsel said that the medical evidence shows the physical sequelae resolved very quickly and it was the psychological and psychiatric issues that led the plaintiff to be advised to attend for play therapy. Counsel said that the child attended 12 sessions of play therapy, “and she seems to have medically made a full recovery’’. The medical reports said the girl is a happy child with no functional impairment and has made a full recovery. The accident though, had been very upsetting for the child. Judge Comerford approved of the settlement figure noting that it was always better that someone makes a complete recovery, though the awards are less. He also noted that reports prepared for the court indicate the girl is doing very well socially and academically. He awarded Circuit Court costs to the girl, and he directed that the sum of €15,000 be paid into court and held there for the benefit of the girl until she reaches the age of 18. Infant (Suing by her Mother) v Bunratty Castle and Folk Park (His Hon. Francis Comerford) Ennis Circuit Court 8 October 2025.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting the requirements of s.51 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act, 2009. The plaintiffs put considerable reliance on a handshake that took place in the kitchen of plaintiff John Magnier’s home, which the plaintiffs claim was an agreement for the purchase of the defendant’s 750-acre Barne Estate. The defendants contended that they did not have the authority to agree to a sale as the land was held in a trust, and the trustees' consent was required for any sale. They also referred to correspondence between the parties that carried the ‘ subject to contract’ notations and that an exclusivity agreement was subsequently executed which itself described the stage as ‘ pre-contract.’ The presiding High Court judge, Mr Justice Barrett accepted that any handshake agreement was expressly qualified by the need for trustee consent, a caveat communicated on the night, and which was confirmed by actions taken the following day to obtain approval. An Coimusiun Pleanala had ruled that the change of use from publicly accessible open space to private use is a development and cannot be considered exempt. That would mean Mr. Howell would have to apply for planning permission. The judge referred to the lack of supporting documentary evidence to support the plaintiffs’ case. He observed that there was no evidence of even an “outline” option agreement having been struck and that the idea of such an option existing alongside a concluded land sale was equally unconvincing, but rather “ the continued discussion of an option pathway is characteristic of ongoing negotiation, not of contractual closure”. In this regard, the court held that the option agreement lacked certainty as to material terms such as the price and mechanism for exercise, and that the most that could be said was that after the handshake over the land, “ Mr Magnier brought up keeping the company route ‘open’ . There is no evidence this was accepted or that any commercial detail (e.g., price, liabilities, or time frame) was discussed.” The judge was further satisfied that the none of the parties in attendance from the defendants’ side had authority, ostensible or otherwise, to commit the first defendant vendor and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that express ratification had occurred on part of the principal or through acquiescence. Further, the judge rejected the contention that what was agreed on 22 August 2023 amounted to a contract subject to a condition precedent, namely trustee approval of the terms reached, finding that position to be untenable as a matter of legal principle, having regard to O’Connor v Coady [2004] 3 IR 271, and on the evidence. The judge also found inter alia that the notion of a concluded contract being in place was inconsistent with the later execution of the exclusivity agreement. That where no oral agreement for the sale of land had been formed, that the requirement under s.51 of the 2009 Act for a note or memorandum in relation to the sale of land was not merely unmet, but rather it was not engaged. In conclusion Mr Justice Barrett observed “ shifting sands ” in respect of the plaintiffs’ accounts of the events central to the case, highlighting that those accounts had altered materially since the inception of the proceedings, and that the changes were fundamental, unexplained and called into question the reliability of the accounts. In that regard, the judge explained: “ The credibility difficulties here arise not from subjective impressions but from the stark divergence between the plaintiffs’ evolving narrative and the fixed points of the contemporaneous documentary record .” Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim. Wachman, Magnier and Magnier v Barne Estate Limited & Ors [2025] IEHC 491

Buying an apartment is different from buying a house, so it is very wise to engage the services of a solicitor. Unlike a house, an apartment usually involves leases, a management company, service charges and other aspects that are not involved in a house purchase where you buy the house outright and own the freehold. Different Title to Apartment Freehold: Here, the building is fully owned. There can still be management charges for the upkeep of the grounds and common areas. Leasehold: Under a lease, the purchaser owns the apartment for a defined number of years usually 999 years actually and is tied into a number of conditions or covenants as to the use of the property and payment of service charge etc. Title Registration Your solicitor will advise on this as to whether the apartment property is registered in the Land Registry or the Registry of Deeds. Covenants – What are These? The lease terms need careful reading from the outset and before one gets too attached to a particular apartment. A covenant is a clause that provides obligations on both the lessor and the tenant. If the landlord sells the property on, the obligations remain, and likewise for the tenant. Note, in some cases, there might be a clause forbidding the keeping of pets and other similar restrictions. Service Charges The management company will seek annual or periodical service charges for maintaining the common areas, insurance, lighting, and lifts if there are any. There should also be a ‘Sinking Fund’ which is a provision for long-term repairs like roof damage or wear & tear. The Conveyancing Process This is the procedure your solicitor will conduct to ensure the apartment is legally yours, that all the planning and statutory requirements have been met, and that you are aware of the obligations that come with the lease purchase. Your solicitor will conduct a number of searches to fully confirm the title to the apartment, which include: Title search – this is to ensure that the seller has a clean title with no mortgages or charges on it on date of closing. Compliance with building and planning regulations Compliance with local authority zoning A search to ensure there are no rights of way, easements, or any kind of restrictions on the property Draft Contract and Pre Contract Enquiries Before a draft contract is prepared, your solicitor will enquire about common areas, any outstanding lawsuits concerning the property, fire safety certification, and any matter that might create issues in the future. A contract is then prepared by the seller’s solicitor, which your solicitor will review, and any clauses that need clarification will be discussed before concluding a sale. Contract & Exchange When your find an apartment you wish to purchase, you can make an offer to the sales agent or negotiate a price. Once accepted, you will pay a booking deposit, which will take the property off the market. This deposit will, in most cases, be refundable until the contracts are fully signed off. After your solicitor has reviewed the contract and advises you that the contract is correct and ready to be signed, you then either pull out or proceed to purchase. Once the contract is signed, by both parties, you are committed to the sale. If a deposit is required and you later withdraw following signed contracts, you will more than likely forfeit the deposit. Completion On the completion date, the balance of the purchase price is paid, and the legal ownership passes fully to the purchaser. Stamp Duty & Registration As stamp duty is nearly always applicable, this must be paid by the purchaser within 30 days after completion. The rate is 1% for most homes and apartments. The apartment must then be registered (in the Land Registry or Registry of Deeds) which your solicitor will look after and lodge the deeds with your bank.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting t

The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting t

Use of Common Green Area The residents of a housing estate in Clondalkin, Dublin had for many years used a green area for recreational purposes. The green area was adjacent to a house whose owner claimed that the green area was part of his property. The green area was known in the neighborhood as ‘the little green.’ The owner of the adjacent house, Keith Howell, objected when the defendant, Patrick McElwee and five people gathered on the green area and sat on deckchairs. Howell, called the gardai as he felt ‘ in fear of what might happen.’ Mr. Howell also claimed that four days previously, he had received a bullet in the post. The area in question had been at the centre of a planning dispute in recent years. Mr. Howell had claimed that the green area is part of his property. However, the residents of the estate claim that the ‘little green’ had been used by everyone since the estate was built in the 1960’s. An Coimusiun Pleanala had ruled that the change of use from publicly accessible open space to private use is a development and cannot be considered exempt. That would mean Mr. Howell would have to apply for planning permission. On the 7th of August 2023 Mr. Elwee and five other people gathered on the green area and sat on deckchairs. Mr. Howell became aware of this with his security camera. As he was in fear of what would happen, he rang the Gardai. Mr. Howell claimed to the court that he was the registered owner of the land although he provided no proof of his ownership. When the gardai arrived, they enquired was he OK and they then spoke with the people on the green area. A garda gave evidence of the incident and said that he believed that the green area was owned by Mr. Howell and that he was in fear of the people on it. The garda ordered the six people off the area but they refused. He cautioned them if they continued to refuse, they would be placed under arrest. The garda identified Mr. McElwee as the ringleader and arrested him. He was taken to Clondalkin Garda Station, and a file was prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions. Counsel for Mr. McElwee submitted to the court that the case be struck out on the grounds that sitting in a deckchair would not be a source of fear to anybody. Judge Hayden said while there was history between the parties that she could only deal with evidence before her. She stated that Mr. Howell had produced no evidence to prove that he did own the land in dispute and based on that and other evidence before the court, she dismissed the case of trespass against the defendant, Mr. McElwee. Howell v McElwee Dublin District Court (Her Hon Catherine Hayden) 31 July 2025.