Students' Eviction Disallowed Despite Damage Done by Friend Two students (the complainants) who lived on UCC’s campus received notices to vacate following complaints that they were responsible for damage to the door of an adjacent apartment. Their tenancy agreement said: ‘ Anti-social behavior will not be tolerated and any student resident acting in this manner will be fined and may face eviction.’ On October 27th last, an incident was reported to the security guard at 10:30 pm. The guard had received a complaint from two girls in an adjacent apartment that a party was taking place in the complainants’ apartment and damage had been done to their apartment’s door. The girls said that they did not feel safe as their door was broken. Alternate accommodation was provided for them. The following night, another complaint was made about another party in the same apartment occupied by the two student complainants. On October 29th, the assistant services manager arranged a meeting with the two student complainants. The students volunteered that a friend of theirs admitted that he had caused the damage while drunk and was willing to pay the €1,112 cost of repairs. However, at the end of the meeting, the students were given a termination notice. The reason given for the termination was that they breached the tenancy license regarding anti-social conduct. The students’ fobs were deactivated but reactivated once the dispute was lodged with the RTB. Complainant, Mr. Walsh, said that they were not aware that the adjacent door had been damaged until they learned it from a friend. He thought they would get a warning and be responsible for the cost of the damage, they were not expecting to be evicted. Their solicitor submitted that there had been ‘no due process followed.’ The Tribunal found that the complainants/ tenants did not permit the behavior of the visitor that caused the damage. It ruled that if the visitor had been persistently harassing the neighbors, it could have followed that the tenants ‘allowed’ the anti-social behavior. But on the evidence presented, the tenants could not reasonably have anticipated the once off damage caused by a visitor. It ruled that a warning notice would have been sufficient and that the notices of termination were invalid. Boyle and Walsh v University College Cork Residential Tenancies Board May 2025. 

How Long is the Process? Many probate applications are straightforward and incur little or no delay in processing. But where the deceased's estate is large with perhaps many investments or beneficiaries in other countries, the process will take much longer. In uncomplicated cases, a straightforward application could be six months, but safer to allow up to 12 months. The more complicated applications could take several years. Sometimes a backlog of applications in the Probate Office can contribute to the delays. What is Involved? Before your solicitor can submit an application for probate to the Probate Office, there is a whole process that must take place. The size of the estate will be a factor. An estate with numerous assets, some of which may be outside Ireland, will take more time to gather the necessary information on which to keep or sell the assets in accordance with the wishes of the deceased. Any disputes over the assets will add time too. Tax issues may be a factor, especially in large estates with assets that may require expert valuation. The executors will work with the solicitor in dealing with issues and identifying assets. The fewer the beneficiaries, the easier it is, but the contrary is the case with many beneficiaries, and especially where there are some disgruntled beneficiaries with various issues concerning the Will or its execution. Where a beneficiary (or a group of them) dispute the Will, this can lead to considerable delays and could result in their issues being resolved in court. This is where a challenge is made to a Will. Executors are supposed to assist in gathering information and assisting the solicitor, but where an executor is slow or inefficient in dealing with issues, this adds time to the process. Assuming there are no major issues to be resolved, the process can be as follows: Starting the work : This involves checking the Will to ensure it has been properly executed and there are no problems with it. Listing the assets and liabilities and identifying who the beneficiaries are and obtaining their addresses. In straightforward Wills where there are no complications, this could be done in a matter of months. When the solicitor is happy that everything is in order, he/she can submit the application for a Grant of Probate. The Grant of Probate applies to where there is a Will and in cases where there is no Will they apply for a Grant of Administration Intestate. Valuation of Assets: After the Grant of Probate has been given, the assets of the deceased are valued. From the proceeds of the sales (and from cash the deceased had) debts are paid which can include the solicitor’s fees, and then the assets (can be shares, property or cash) are distributed to the beneficiaries in accordance with the Will after any Inheritance tax is paid to the Revenue. Closure: After distributing all the assets in accordance with the Will, paying off liabilities and concluding any issues, the estate can be closed. While the time taken for the Grant of Probate can vary according to the details of the Will, an average time could be 12 – 18 months as a general rule. Engaging a Solicitor Probate work is an expertise of solicitors, and while an executor can do the work for processing a Will, it is better to engage a solicitor to avoid time delays and most especially if any issues arise. Solicitors are well used to dealing with Wills, whereas an executor would be new to issues arising, and this could add a considerable delay to the process.

Counsel for the plaintiff told the court that the plaintiff, who was 13 at the time, attended the vaccination centre in Citywest Hotel, Saggart, Co. Dublin in August 2021, for the COVID vaccination, and said the nurse administered the wrong vaccination and used a needle that had been used on three other people. In evidence, the child’s father stated to the court in written testimony that the second vaccination had been administered without discussion and consent of either himself or his daughter. He further said that that the nurse who administered the vaccination, had denied that the first syringe had been used previously. On further enquiry with the head nurse, it transpired that the syringe had in fact been used on another person. Following this incident, the child had to undergo blood tests and be vaccinated for Hepatitis B. it was pointed out to the court that at least one of the three persons who had been given the vaccination with the same syringe refused to undergo blood tests. As a result of this the plaintiff had to undergo a post-exposure antiretroviral therapy course over a month. The result of this brought on nausea and generally feeling unwell. She had to undergo a number of other tests as a result of the actions of the HSE in administering the vaccine in this fashion. The court was told that a year after the incident, the plaintiff developed an abscess that ruptured during her school sports day, which added to the stress she already suffered. This was treated with antibiotics. Counsel for the plaintiff informed the court that the defendant had initially offered €15,500 in settlement but this had been rejected earlier by another judge. This was then increased to €16,500, then €20,000 with expenses and legal costs, which was accepted. The barrister for the HSE read out an apology on behalf of the HSE. Ella Mulhern (Suing through her Father) v The HSE Circuit Civil Court (Ms. Justice Fiona O’Sullivan) 23 June 2025. 

A newspaper that incorrectly published the name of the respondent in the ‘tax defaulters list’ appealed the decision of the High Court awarding the respondent damages. The respondent had no connection with the companies named and had been identified in the article by mistake. The respondent sued for defamation. The appellant, in its defence, relied on section 18 of the Defa mation Act 2009, claiming qualified privilege, in which it was acting in good faith by publishing the article as part of its duty to report on matters of public interest. The High Court found no basis for the defence of qualified privilege in circumstances where the communication of inaccurate information was outside its scope, as the publisher had no duty or interest in communicating and the public had no interest in receiving inaccurate information. The jury awarded the respondent €75,000 in damages, leading the High Court to award Circuit Court costs only to the respondent. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the findings made in respect of qualified privilege, with the respondent cross-appealing the award of costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal and allowed the respondent’s cross-appeal, finding inter alia that the defence of qualified privilege required a mutuality of duty or interest which, in practice, confined the defence to situations involving individuals (or groups of individuals) rather than to the public at large and that it would be extraordinary to allow the appellant to rely upon the defence where its article was not fair and accurate. Following this the appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the issues of the nature and scope of qualified privilege and its relationship with section 18(3) and the defence of public interest reporting under section 26 of the 2009 Act. Leave to appeal was also granted in respect of the costs issue. The Supreme Court observed that the defence of qualified privilege did not generally apply to publication to the world at large because of the absence of the necessary reciprocity, the judge further considered that if the only safeguard for a defamed claimant is to discharge the “heavy onus” of establishing malice, and if a finding of malice is excluded by an honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, however unreasonable that belief may be and regardless of whether the belief was the product of the publisher’s own carelessness, “then in the context of media publication, malice is an illusory and inadequate ‘safety switch’”. The court also reasoned that privilege is intended to foster free communication in defined circumstances and/or for defined purposes by protecting the publisher from potential liability with the provision of a defence that does not require the publisher to take on the burden of establishing the truth of what has been said, but that the protection of false speech is “an incidental effect of that protection, not its principal objective or primary rationale”. Noting that the principal exception to the general rule that qualified privilege does not apply to publication to the world at large, being the fair and accurate reporting of certain proceedings and reports, has now been largely subsumed into s.18(3) of the 2009 Act, Mr Justice Collins opined: “None of these specific and relatively small-bore exceptions are capable of being stretched to accommodate a generally applicable media privilege.” The court disagreed with the proposition that the defence of qualified privilege at common law could extend to media publication/publication to the world at large on the basis of a recognition of a duty to publish public interest material in the interests of the public as a whole, and that the jurisprudence provided no support for that suggestion save as regards the fair and accurate reporting of particular proceedings and reports. Accordingly, the court found that no common law defence of qualified privilege was available to the appellant and moved to consider whether the appellant had a defence under section 18(2). The court considered the appellant’s argument that section 18(2) radically altered the law of qualified privilege by extending its protection to a broad category of media and non-media publication subject only to the absence of malice. The court considered that this would provide a defence for inaccurate reporting in circumstances where the Oireachtas has, in section 18(3), legislated to provide a defence strictly conditioned upon the fairness and accuracy of the reporting and requiring consideration of the public interest and benefit. The court found that such an interpretation of section 18(2) would “effectively swallow up section 26 entirely”, it would also “negate the judgment made by the Oireachtas in deciding on the parameters of the section 26 defence and frustrate its purpose in enacting that defence”. The Supreme Court found that the jury was entitled to take the view that the respondent had been defamed. The court dismissed the appeal of the newspaper appellant and the respondent’s appeal on costs. William Bird (respondent) v Iconic Newspapers Limited (appellant) [2025] IESC 30.

A customer of Supermac’s fast-food restaurant took a personal injury case against the company as a result of an incident. CCTV showed that having purchased a packet of crisps, she could be seen looking at her mobile phone and turning to leave. As she made her way to the exit, she tripped over a vacuum cleaner that was on the floor. The plaintiff admitted in evidence that she had gotten a message on her phone, got distracted and then tripped over the vacuum cleaner and fell. While assisted by her husband and the shop manager, the footage showed that she was able to stand up within 19 seconds unaided. The Maskey Report had found that 240 children received ‘risky’ care from South Kerry CAMHS between July 2016 and April 2021, with proof of significant harm to 46 of them. She blamed the vacuum cleaner for her accident and was seen placing her hand on her lower back. Later she attended the A & E, she was three months pregnant, but a scan showed all was well with the pregnancy. She also went to her GP following the accident. Under cross examination, the plaintiff conceded that the vacuum cleaner was there when she made her way to the till and she had no problem with it then. The judge commented that while the location of the vacuum cleaner was negligent, the question was, did it cause the plaintiff to fall. He said that not every negligent act results in liability. The court must ask, the judge said, whether the plaintiff was taking due care at the time when the accident occurred and he believed that she was not. On this basis, the judge found that the plaintiff was ‘wholly distracted’ by her phone when she tripped over the hoover and dismissed her claim. Darcy v Supermac’s Restaurants Galway Circuit Court (His Hon. Judge O’Callahan) 16 July 2025. 

A hospital consultant claimed to have been penalized and sidelined following her making protected disclosures. As a result of these actions by the HSE, the consultant child psychiatrist resigned her post and left Ireland. The doctor’s whistleblowing was subsequently vindicated by the Maskey Report, a major external review published in 2022. The Maskey Report had found that 240 children received ‘risky’ care from South Kerry CAMHS between July 2016 and April 2021, with proof of significant harm to 46 of them. The scandal involved misdiagnosis and misprescribing medication to children. The Report showed sub-standard care, with unreliable diagnoses, inappropriate prescriptions, poor monitoring of treatment, and potential adverse effects. Much of the actions related to a junior doctor but significant failings in supervision and governance were also identified. The doctor made a protected disclosure and because of the manner in which she was subsequently treated, she claimed racial discrimination. She issued proceedings in August 2023 seeking damages for breach of statutory duty, breach of contract, breach of the Protected Disclosures Act, failure to provide a safe place of work and the infliction of emotional suffering. The HSE settled the case before the case went for trial and agreed to pay the plaintiff doctor €75,000 damages. Dr. Maya Sharma v HSE High Court July 2025

A widow and executor who was the sole beneficiary of her husband’s estate, served a notice of termination on the tenant of her late husband. She wanted the apartment back for her granddaughter. The rental property was part of her deceased husband’s estate and prior to his death, the rent was paid into an account in the

A stable employee working in a racehorse trainer’s premises injured his back while emptying a wheelbarrow of horse dung into a dung heap.

An interesting case came before the High Court where the plaintiff alleged that Boots Pharmacy was negligent in giving her medicine for a migraine complaint, where it was alleged that the pharmacist failed to advise the plaintiff that the migraine medication contraindicated with an antidepressant drug she was taking. As a result, the plaintiff suffered a brain bleed and stroke. In the proceedings, it was claimed that the medicine was allegedly inappropriately sold to the plaintiff and consequently there was an alleged failure by Boots Pharmacy to advise the plaintiff that the migraine medication is contraindicated with an antidepressant drug that the plaintiff was taking. This was due to a significant interaction between the two medications and can lead to blood pressure and strokes. Boots Pharmacy vehemently denied all the claims made by the plaintiff and explained their defence to the court. The witness for the pharmacy said they could not remember the plaintiff purchasing the medication but stated that their protocol required that anyone purchasing migraine medication is referred to a pharmacist in the store. The plaintiff said that she took the migraine medication when she woke up with a terrible headache. She felt dizzy after taking the tablets, collapsed and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. There a scan was taken showing a brain bleed. She was in hospital for a month and after discharge suffered severe left leg weakness, difficulties with her left arm and had to go for rehabilitation. The plaintiff claimed that at time of purchasing the migraine tablets, there was no consultation with the pharmacist. Boots disputed this. Boots claimed that there was a responsibility on the plaintiff to inform the pharmacist of her medical history, and without doing so, they could not have been aware of other medications she was taking. As a result of this information not being disclosed to the pharmacist, there was contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Boots said without the plaintiff disclosing her other medications she was taking, there was no way that they could have known that the migraine medication would conflict with her other medication and thus the plaintiff was the author of her own misfortune. The parties settled the case without admission of liability by Boots Pharmacy, so we don’t know how the case would have been decided. But it does appear clear that the plaintiff, not mentioning to Boots Pharmacy at the time of the purchase of her other medicines, did contribute to the suffering she later endured.  O’Meara v Boots Pharmacy High Court (Miss Justice Denise Brett) 26 June 2025.