The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting the requirements of s.51 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act, 2009. The plaintiffs put considerable reliance on a handshake that took place in the kitchen of plaintiff John Magnier’s home, which the plaintiffs claim was an agreement for the purchase of the defendant’s 750-acre Barne Estate. The defendants contended that they did not have the authority to agree to a sale as the land was held in a trust, and the trustees' consent was required for any sale. They also referred to correspondence between the parties that carried the ‘ subject to contract’ notations and that an exclusivity agreement was subsequently executed which itself described the stage as ‘ pre-contract.’ The presiding High Court judge, Mr Justice Barrett accepted that any handshake agreement was expressly qualified by the need for trustee consent, a caveat communicated on the night, and which was confirmed by actions taken the following day to obtain approval. An Coimusiun Pleanala had ruled that the change of use from publicly accessible open space to private use is a development and cannot be considered exempt. That would mean Mr. Howell would have to apply for planning permission. The judge referred to the lack of supporting documentary evidence to support the plaintiffs’ case. He observed that there was no evidence of even an “outline” option agreement having been struck and that the idea of such an option existing alongside a concluded land sale was equally unconvincing, but rather “ the continued discussion of an option pathway is characteristic of ongoing negotiation, not of contractual closure”. In this regard, the court held that the option agreement lacked certainty as to material terms such as the price and mechanism for exercise, and that the most that could be said was that after the handshake over the land, “ Mr Magnier brought up keeping the company route ‘open’ . There is no evidence this was accepted or that any commercial detail (e.g., price, liabilities, or time frame) was discussed.” The judge was further satisfied that the none of the parties in attendance from the defendants’ side had authority, ostensible or otherwise, to commit the first defendant vendor and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that express ratification had occurred on part of the principal or through acquiescence. Further, the judge rejected the contention that what was agreed on 22 August 2023 amounted to a contract subject to a condition precedent, namely trustee approval of the terms reached, finding that position to be untenable as a matter of legal principle, having regard to O’Connor v Coady [2004] 3 IR 271, and on the evidence. The judge also found inter alia that the notion of a concluded contract being in place was inconsistent with the later execution of the exclusivity agreement. That where no oral agreement for the sale of land had been formed, that the requirement under s.51 of the 2009 Act for a note or memorandum in relation to the sale of land was not merely unmet, but rather it was not engaged. In conclusion Mr Justice Barrett observed “ shifting sands ” in respect of the plaintiffs’ accounts of the events central to the case, highlighting that those accounts had altered materially since the inception of the proceedings, and that the changes were fundamental, unexplained and called into question the reliability of the accounts. In that regard, the judge explained: “ The credibility difficulties here arise not from subjective impressions but from the stark divergence between the plaintiffs’ evolving narrative and the fixed points of the contemporaneous documentary record .” Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim. Wachman, Magnier and Magnier v Barne Estate Limited & Ors [2025] IEHC 491

The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting t

The plaintiffs sought to enforce the sale of estate land in Co. Tipperary, which they claimed was concluded by a handshake between the parties. They also claimed a breach of an exclusivity agreement. The defendants denied that any oral agreement had been concluded by a handshake and that there was no document meeting t

Use of Common Green Area The residents of a housing estate in Clondalkin, Dublin had for many years used a green area for recreational purposes. The green area was adjacent to a house whose owner claimed that the green area was part of his property. The green area was known in the neighborhood as ‘the little green.’ The owner of the adjacent house, Keith Howell, objected when the defendant, Patrick McElwee and five people gathered on the green area and sat on deckchairs. Howell, called the gardai as he felt ‘ in fear of what might happen.’ Mr. Howell also claimed that four days previously, he had received a bullet in the post. The area in question had been at the centre of a planning dispute in recent years. Mr. Howell had claimed that the green area is part of his property. However, the residents of the estate claim that the ‘little green’ had been used by everyone since the estate was built in the 1960’s. An Coimusiun Pleanala had ruled that the change of use from publicly accessible open space to private use is a development and cannot be considered exempt. That would mean Mr. Howell would have to apply for planning permission. On the 7th of August 2023 Mr. Elwee and five other people gathered on the green area and sat on deckchairs. Mr. Howell became aware of this with his security camera. As he was in fear of what would happen, he rang the Gardai. Mr. Howell claimed to the court that he was the registered owner of the land although he provided no proof of his ownership. When the gardai arrived, they enquired was he OK and they then spoke with the people on the green area. A garda gave evidence of the incident and said that he believed that the green area was owned by Mr. Howell and that he was in fear of the people on it. The garda ordered the six people off the area but they refused. He cautioned them if they continued to refuse, they would be placed under arrest. The garda identified Mr. McElwee as the ringleader and arrested him. He was taken to Clondalkin Garda Station, and a file was prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions. Counsel for Mr. McElwee submitted to the court that the case be struck out on the grounds that sitting in a deckchair would not be a source of fear to anybody. Judge Hayden said while there was history between the parties that she could only deal with evidence before her. She stated that Mr. Howell had produced no evidence to prove that he did own the land in dispute and based on that and other evidence before the court, she dismissed the case of trespass against the defendant, Mr. McElwee. Howell v McElwee Dublin District Court (Her Hon Catherine Hayden) 31 July 2025.

Students' Eviction Disallowed Despite Damage Done by Friend Two students (the complainants) who lived on UCC’s campus received notices to vacate following complaints that they were responsible for damage to the door of an adjacent apartment. Their tenancy agreement said: ‘ Anti-social behavior will not be tolerated and any student resident acting in this manner will be fined and may face eviction.’ On October 27th last, an incident was reported to the security guard at 10:30 pm. The guard had received a complaint from two girls in an adjacent apartment that a party was taking place in the complainants’ apartment and damage had been done to their apartment’s door. The girls said that they did not feel safe as their door was broken. Alternate accommodation was provided for them. The following night, another complaint was made about another party in the same apartment occupied by the two student complainants. On October 29th, the assistant services manager arranged a meeting with the two student complainants. The students volunteered that a friend of theirs admitted that he had caused the damage while drunk and was willing to pay the €1,112 cost of repairs. However, at the end of the meeting, the students were given a termination notice. The reason given for the termination was that they breached the tenancy license regarding anti-social conduct. The students’ fobs were deactivated but reactivated once the dispute was lodged with the RTB. Complainant, Mr. Walsh, said that they were not aware that the adjacent door had been damaged until they learned it from a friend. He thought they would get a warning and be responsible for the cost of the damage, they were not expecting to be evicted. Their solicitor submitted that there had been ‘no due process followed.’ The Tribunal found that the complainants/ tenants did not permit the behavior of the visitor that caused the damage. It ruled that if the visitor had been persistently harassing the neighbors, it could have followed that the tenants ‘allowed’ the anti-social behavior. But on the evidence presented, the tenants could not reasonably have anticipated the once off damage caused by a visitor. It ruled that a warning notice would have been sufficient and that the notices of termination were invalid. Boyle and Walsh v University College Cork Residential Tenancies Board May 2025. 

How Long is the Process? Many probate applications are straightforward and incur little or no delay in processing. But where the deceased's estate is large with perhaps many investments or beneficiaries in other countries, the process will take much longer. In uncomplicated cases, a straightforward application could be six months, but safer to allow up to 12 months. The more complicated applications could take several years. Sometimes a backlog of applications in the Probate Office can contribute to the delays. What is Involved? Before your solicitor can submit an application for probate to the Probate Office, there is a whole process that must take place. The size of the estate will be a factor. An estate with numerous assets, some of which may be outside Ireland, will take more time to gather the necessary information on which to keep or sell the assets in accordance with the wishes of the deceased. Any disputes over the assets will add time too. Tax issues may be a factor, especially in large estates with assets that may require expert valuation. The executors will work with the solicitor in dealing with issues and identifying assets. The fewer the beneficiaries, the easier it is, but the contrary is the case with many beneficiaries, and especially where there are some disgruntled beneficiaries with various issues concerning the Will or its execution. Where a beneficiary (or a group of them) dispute the Will, this can lead to considerable delays and could result in their issues being resolved in court. This is where a challenge is made to a Will. Executors are supposed to assist in gathering information and assisting the solicitor, but where an executor is slow or inefficient in dealing with issues, this adds time to the process. Assuming there are no major issues to be resolved, the process can be as follows: Starting the work : This involves checking the Will to ensure it has been properly executed and there are no problems with it. Listing the assets and liabilities and identifying who the beneficiaries are and obtaining their addresses. In straightforward Wills where there are no complications, this could be done in a matter of months. When the solicitor is happy that everything is in order, he/she can submit the application for a Grant of Probate. The Grant of Probate applies to where there is a Will and in cases where there is no Will they apply for a Grant of Administration Intestate. Valuation of Assets: After the Grant of Probate has been given, the assets of the deceased are valued. From the proceeds of the sales (and from cash the deceased had) debts are paid which can include the solicitor’s fees, and then the assets (can be shares, property or cash) are distributed to the beneficiaries in accordance with the Will after any Inheritance tax is paid to the Revenue. Closure: After distributing all the assets in accordance with the Will, paying off liabilities and concluding any issues, the estate can be closed. While the time taken for the Grant of Probate can vary according to the details of the Will, an average time could be 12 – 18 months as a general rule. Engaging a Solicitor Probate work is an expertise of solicitors, and while an executor can do the work for processing a Will, it is better to engage a solicitor to avoid time delays and most especially if any issues arise. Solicitors are well used to dealing with Wills, whereas an executor would be new to issues arising, and this could add a considerable delay to the process.

Counsel for the plaintiff told the court that the plaintiff, who was 13 at the time, attended the vaccination centre in Citywest Hotel, Saggart, Co. Dublin in August 2021, for the COVID vaccination, and said the nurse administered the wrong vaccination and used a needle that had been used on three other people. In evidence, the child’s father stated to the court in written testimony that the second vaccination had been administered without discussion and consent of either himself or his daughter. He further said that that the nurse who administered the vaccination, had denied that the first syringe had been used previously. On further enquiry with the head nurse, it transpired that the syringe had in fact been used on another person. Following this incident, the child had to undergo blood tests and be vaccinated for Hepatitis B. it was pointed out to the court that at least one of the three persons who had been given the vaccination with the same syringe refused to undergo blood tests. As a result of this the plaintiff had to undergo a post-exposure antiretroviral therapy course over a month. The result of this brought on nausea and generally feeling unwell. She had to undergo a number of other tests as a result of the actions of the HSE in administering the vaccine in this fashion. The court was told that a year after the incident, the plaintiff developed an abscess that ruptured during her school sports day, which added to the stress she already suffered. This was treated with antibiotics. Counsel for the plaintiff informed the court that the defendant had initially offered €15,500 in settlement but this had been rejected earlier by another judge. This was then increased to €16,500, then €20,000 with expenses and legal costs, which was accepted. The barrister for the HSE read out an apology on behalf of the HSE. Ella Mulhern (Suing through her Father) v The HSE Circuit Civil Court (Ms. Justice Fiona O’Sullivan) 23 June 2025. 

A newspaper that incorrectly published the name of the respondent in the ‘tax defaulters list’ appealed the decision of the High Court awarding the respondent damages. The respondent had no connection with the companies named and had been identified in the article by mistake. The respondent sued for defamation. The appellant, in its defence, relied on section 18 of the Defa mation Act 2009, claiming qualified privilege, in which it was acting in good faith by publishing the article as part of its duty to report on matters of public interest. The High Court found no basis for the defence of qualified privilege in circumstances where the communication of inaccurate information was outside its scope, as the publisher had no duty or interest in communicating and the public had no interest in receiving inaccurate information. The jury awarded the respondent €75,000 in damages, leading the High Court to award Circuit Court costs only to the respondent. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the findings made in respect of qualified privilege, with the respondent cross-appealing the award of costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal and allowed the respondent’s cross-appeal, finding inter alia that the defence of qualified privilege required a mutuality of duty or interest which, in practice, confined the defence to situations involving individuals (or groups of individuals) rather than to the public at large and that it would be extraordinary to allow the appellant to rely upon the defence where its article was not fair and accurate. Following this the appellant was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the issues of the nature and scope of qualified privilege and its relationship with section 18(3) and the defence of public interest reporting under section 26 of the 2009 Act. Leave to appeal was also granted in respect of the costs issue. The Supreme Court observed that the defence of qualified privilege did not generally apply to publication to the world at large because of the absence of the necessary reciprocity, the judge further considered that if the only safeguard for a defamed claimant is to discharge the “heavy onus” of establishing malice, and if a finding of malice is excluded by an honest belief in the truth of the defamatory statement, however unreasonable that belief may be and regardless of whether the belief was the product of the publisher’s own carelessness, “then in the context of media publication, malice is an illusory and inadequate ‘safety switch’”. The court also reasoned that privilege is intended to foster free communication in defined circumstances and/or for defined purposes by protecting the publisher from potential liability with the provision of a defence that does not require the publisher to take on the burden of establishing the truth of what has been said, but that the protection of false speech is “an incidental effect of that protection, not its principal objective or primary rationale”. Noting that the principal exception to the general rule that qualified privilege does not apply to publication to the world at large, being the fair and accurate reporting of certain proceedings and reports, has now been largely subsumed into s.18(3) of the 2009 Act, Mr Justice Collins opined: “None of these specific and relatively small-bore exceptions are capable of being stretched to accommodate a generally applicable media privilege.” The court disagreed with the proposition that the defence of qualified privilege at common law could extend to media publication/publication to the world at large on the basis of a recognition of a duty to publish public interest material in the interests of the public as a whole, and that the jurisprudence provided no support for that suggestion save as regards the fair and accurate reporting of particular proceedings and reports. Accordingly, the court found that no common law defence of qualified privilege was available to the appellant and moved to consider whether the appellant had a defence under section 18(2). The court considered the appellant’s argument that section 18(2) radically altered the law of qualified privilege by extending its protection to a broad category of media and non-media publication subject only to the absence of malice. The court considered that this would provide a defence for inaccurate reporting in circumstances where the Oireachtas has, in section 18(3), legislated to provide a defence strictly conditioned upon the fairness and accuracy of the reporting and requiring consideration of the public interest and benefit. The court found that such an interpretation of section 18(2) would “effectively swallow up section 26 entirely”, it would also “negate the judgment made by the Oireachtas in deciding on the parameters of the section 26 defence and frustrate its purpose in enacting that defence”. The Supreme Court found that the jury was entitled to take the view that the respondent had been defamed. The court dismissed the appeal of the newspaper appellant and the respondent’s appeal on costs. William Bird (respondent) v Iconic Newspapers Limited (appellant) [2025] IESC 30.

A customer of Supermac’s fast-food restaurant took a personal injury case against the company as a result of an incident. CCTV showed that having purchased a packet of crisps, she could be seen looking at her mobile phone and turning to leave. As she made her way to the exit, she tripped over a vacuum cleaner that was on the floor. The plaintiff admitted in evidence that she had gotten a message on her phone, got distracted and then tripped over the vacuum cleaner and fell. While assisted by her husband and the shop manager, the footage showed that she was able to stand up within 19 seconds unaided. The Maskey Report had found that 240 children received ‘risky’ care from South Kerry CAMHS between July 2016 and April 2021, with proof of significant harm to 46 of them. She blamed the vacuum cleaner for her accident and was seen placing her hand on her lower back. Later she attended the A & E, she was three months pregnant, but a scan showed all was well with the pregnancy. She also went to her GP following the accident. Under cross examination, the plaintiff conceded that the vacuum cleaner was there when she made her way to the till and she had no problem with it then. The judge commented that while the location of the vacuum cleaner was negligent, the question was, did it cause the plaintiff to fall. He said that not every negligent act results in liability. The court must ask, the judge said, whether the plaintiff was taking due care at the time when the accident occurred and he believed that she was not. On this basis, the judge found that the plaintiff was ‘wholly distracted’ by her phone when she tripped over the hoover and dismissed her claim. Darcy v Supermac’s Restaurants Galway Circuit Court (His Hon. Judge O’Callahan) 16 July 2025.