A case came before the Workplace Relations Commission concerning a transition student being punished by the school for the wearing of an earring in one ear. The school had a rule that students could wear a pair of earrings but not a single earring. At the start of term last year, the student arrived at the school wearing a round silver stud earring in one ear. The student differed with the school on the rule concerning the wearing of earrings. The student’s mother and grandmother became involved with the school about the issue and attended a meeting with the school’s principal which they believed was a hostile meeting. In evidence before the WRC, the school principal denied this. Following the meeting, the student was punished for breach of the rule. The punishment consisted of not being allowed to leave school with other students for lunch and finish school later. The solicitor for the student said that an amicable solution had been sought, but as opinions differed, it became necessary to bring the matter to the WRC. He said that the student felt that his reputation had been attacked as the pressure escalated between the parties over what the student thought was an absurd rule about the wearing of earrings. The student felt the rule didn’t make any sense and was an interference with a student’s right to express themselves. It was submitted that the punishment was disproportionate and unwarranted, and breached his right to wear one earring when other students could wear one in each ear. The school submitted that it followed its disciplinary code at all times in dealing with the student and sought to de-escalate the issue. The WRC found that the school had discriminated against the student on the grounds of gender and ordered the rule to be changed to permit students to wear one or two earrings and awarded the student €9,000 in compensation. The money was to be paid to his mother until the student reached the age of 18 and used for his education until then. The WRC decided not to publish the names of the parties. Student (Minor) v Secondary School Ref No. ADJ-00054056, 5 June 2025

There can be occasions where a person or persons wish to challenge the Will of a loved one. The grounds can vary, but common grounds are that they may have felt that the deceased (testator) was not of sound mind when making their Will, or that another person exercised undue influence on the person making the Will, or that a beneficiary may feel that they were unfairly treated by the Will or that the Will was invalid. A child of the deceased may claim that they were treated less fairly that other siblings and thus would be entitled to challenge the Will. In this case, a court will investigate any disbursements during the testator’s lifetime that might have been the reason why the challenger was left less of the testator's assets than his/her siblings. The court seeks to read the intention of the testator and interpret it accordingly. A person who was a financial dependent of the testator would have a similar claim. This group could be children, spouse, adopted/fostered children, civil partners, grandchildren or step-grandchildren. Outside of this group i.e. nephews or nieces, a claim can be made, but it will be for the court to decide whether they have a legitimate claim or not. Testator was Not of Sound Mind A Will can be challenged if it is claimed that the testator lacked the ‘necessary capacity’ at the time of signing of the Will. This means, the person making the Will was not of sound mind and did not understand what they were doing or signing. For such a claim to be successful, medical evidence would have to be produced to show that the testator lacked the mental capacity to understand what they were doing or signing. Invalid Wills For a Will to be valid, it must fulfil certain conditions: The Will must be in writing. It must be signed by the person who made the Will in front of two independent witnesses. The witnesses must not be beneficiaries. The person who made the Will must be over 18 and of sound mind. The witnesses themselves must be over 18. Undue Influence Put simply, this amounts to putting pressure on a person to do something they might not do or want to do themselves. In Wills, it might be persuading the testator to leave an asset to somebody. A court will look at a Will that is being contested to ascertain if the testator put some provision in the Will that was out of character for the testator. Or if one beneficiary has done very well from the Will, which looked out of place. Another ground here could be that a gift in the Will was in contrast with the previously expressed intentions of the deceased. Contesting a Will is a complex issue, so engaging the services of a solicitor is critical. The claim against a Will is to overturn all or part of the Will, and that requires establishing to the court the evidence necessary to invalidate the will and this is where your solicitor will guide you on what is regarded as one of the most difficult tasks in any court proceedings.

A case came before the High Court where a young Spanish national was admitted to hospital when he became unwell in Ireland. . He spent 42 days in St. James’s Hospital (SJH) without his condition being diagnosed, while within four days in a Spanish hospital, it was identified and treated. The plaintiff submitted that he had two features that should have alerted the staff in SJH that treated him on admission: firstly, the epidemiological association between HIV, VL and Spain, combined with the fact that the plaintiff was HIV positive and was from Spain, and secondly, the plaintiff’s “massive splenomegaly” or enlarged spleen. While in SJH, the plaintiff was diagnosed with hemophagocytic lympho-histiocytosis (HLH) triggered by herpes virus type 8 (HHV-8) in the context of HIV. The plaintiff alleged that none of the consultants who managed, investigated, and cared for the plaintiff during his admission considered the possibility of visceral leishmaniasis (VL) during his ensuing 42-day admission to SJH, a condition which is fatal if left untreated in 95 per cent of cases. After 42 days in SJH, he was transferred to a Spanish hospital, where he was correctly diagnosed with his condition in four days. He sued SJH for damages for their failure to diagnose visceral leishmaniasis (VL). The issue before the High Court was to decide whether SJH should have diagnosed VL within four days of the plaintiff’s admission to the hospital’s care, and if so what would have followed in terms of treatment and recovery. Ms Justice Egan of the High Court considered the authorities, namely, Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91 and Morrissey v. HSE [2020] IESC 6 requiring the court to assess ‘whether no reasonable professional of the type concerned could have carried out their task in the manner which occurred in the case in question. That overall test requires a court to determine what standard a reasonable professional would apply.” The court then examined what proper professional standard should have been applied, and noted “No clinician can be expected to be in touch with every single piece of literature and every publication or Guideline. Rather, they would be expected to follow those most relevant to their own practice.” The judge was satisfied that although clinicians treating HIV patients may know of potential associations with dozens of opportunistic infections, the standard approach requires the application of discrimination to the task of diagnosis and the keeping of diagnoses under review, “they are not compelled, at least at an early stage of management, to explore each and every potentially viable diagnosis that might conceivably apply.” The judge was not satisfied that SJH had looked beyond a reasonable diagnosis of HLH to interpret the plaintiff’s enlarged spleen as strongly indicative of VL. On the balance of the evidence before the court of the early treatment of the plaintiff while in SJH’s care, that in the period between 10 March 2014 to 14 March 2014, a considerable suspicion of VL ought to have arisen leading to the commencement of empirical AmBisome, which was not commenced until over three weeks later on 4 April 2014, and that negligence arose in this regard. Therefore, the High Court found as to causation, that if the plaintiff had been commenced on AmBisome during the week of 10 March 2014, his improvement within a week and substantial recovery within two weeks could reasonably have been anticipated, sparing him from three weeks of hospital admission with painful and debilitating symptoms and “anxiety, distress and worry as to his health”. Causation having been established and the expected standard of care being breached, the High Court awarded the plaintiff €26,000 in general damages. No claim had been made for future pain and suffering. AMS v Birthistle [2025] IEHC 331.

A case came before the High Court for a Norwich Pharmacal Order. This order is defined as: ‘A Norwich Pharmacal Order (NPO) in Ireland is a legal order granted by the court to compel a third party to disclose information that can help identify a wrongdoer. It's an exception to the general rule that discovery (obtaining information) is only allowed after proceedings are closed. Essentially, it's a way to uncover information from someone who might be unknowingly involved in wrongful actions by others’. The case before the court was to do with Internet fraud, where the applicant was seeking an order for a bank to disclose the photo ID of a person who may have information in regard to the alleged fraud. The applicant was a French citizen residing in France and who responded to an ad in social media in 2021 for an investment opportunity. Following engagement with a ‘Mr Becker’ who purported to be a representative of Skandia Bank in Berlin, the applicant invested €280,000 in what he believed were investment vehicles to acquire care home facilities in Spain. The applicant proceeded to make money transfers to various bank accounts in Spain. In total the applicant invested €1.5 million. Later that year, the plaintiff was contacted by a ‘Mr Lemercier’, purportedly a representative of Santander Bank in Paris, who advised that the investment opportunity availed of by the plaintiff was fraudulent and that he should withdraw the investments. The applicant realised that he was a victim of fraud and tried to contact the ‘Mr. Lemercier’ at the bank, but he was informed that no person of that name worked for the bank. Despite lodging criminal complaints with criminal authorities in a number of EU countries, the identities of both Mr Becker and Mr Lemercier were unknown. The applicant sought orders requiring the defendant company to provide information to assist him in identifying unknown individuals, including inter alia the names, addresses, dates of birth, email addresses and telephone numbers of the persons who opened the Irish bank accounts and any beneficiaries of those accounts, details of all transactions and payments made into or out of those accounts, and copies of the documentation used to open the accounts including identity verification documentation. The defendant company consented to all reliefs except for the provision of ID documentation. So, the issue before the court concerned compelling the defendant to release the photo ID of the person or persons who opened the bank accounts whereupon the applicant hoped he could trace the money stolen. The judge considered the case law and the principles relating to Norwich Pharmacal orders (NPOs) and Bankers Trust orders. He was satisfied the case fell under the NPO equitable relief and in Ireland Megaleasing UK Ltd. v Barrett [1993] ILRM 497 approved the original case establishing the UK case of NPO of Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133. Under such a case an NPO compels a defendant to provide specified information that would assist to identify a third party who has committed an actionable wrong against a plaintiff and places a plaintiff in a position to identify and seek redress against a previously unknown wrongdoer. Considering the issues in this case, the judge observed ‘ Cybercrime is a growing threat to the worldwide economy, but particularly, the economies of the western world. There is little doubt that the plaintiff has been the victim of a concerted cybercrime involving multiple subterfuges.” And ‘In this case, a picture or photo of the individual who opened the account, will be of far greater assistance in leading to the location or preservation of the plaintiff’s money than simply, a name, address or e-mail with contact details.” The defendant submitted that it was not necessary to bring a claim for the ID documentation but the judge disagreed stating: “While I appreciate there is no Irish authority to support the proposition, it seems to me to be an extension of the equitable jurisdiction and to coin a phrase often used in equitable cases, it seems to be ‘just and convenient’. Decision The judge found that the refusal of the application would significantly disfavour the applicant and that the applicant’s interests in obtaining the order were far greater than any detriment arising to the defendant in relation to confidentiality and the European Convention on Human Rights . The court considered that it was difficult to see what detriment would arise in circumstances where the applicant is obliged to give appropriate undertakings. The judge commented that the delay in bringing the application was not fatal and deemed the provision of photographic-type documentation appropriate in the circumstances, and thus granted the orders sought. Jean Pierre Boulbet v Sumup Limited [2025] IEHC 285 .

The plaintiff in this case emerged from a hotel lift when she slipped and injured her elbow and foot, causing hospitalization. The plaintiff was with her husband and others when the accident happened. Her husband noticed a wet surface and the floor area where she fell and presumed this was the cause of his wife to fall. In describing her accident, the plaintiff told the court that she ‘went to step onto the carpet and [she] went down on to the ground.’ She was cross-examined by counsel for the defendant as to the wording in the personal injuries’ summons and the initial letter from her solicitor to the defendant. Here was there a difference in the description of her fall. The personal injury summons described it as: ‘At approximately 5:30pm the plaintiff… whilst exiting a lift in the company of her husband and other guests… was caused to slip and fall by reason of the said floor being wet and/or slippy due to the presence of a deleterious substance thereon.” While the original solicitor’s letter said: ‘At approximately 5:30p.m. when exiting the elevator… she had walked with others a number of steps from the elevator, slipped on the floor and fell to the ground.’ The judge was satisfied with the plaintiff’s evidence in the circumstances of the fall while acknowledging she did not know the cause of it. CCTV footage was produced in evidence and examined in great detail. But its location could not give an indication as to the condition of the floor. Witnesses for the hotel gave evidence of the hotel’s procedure for maintaining areas where guests use. A manager gave evidence for the defendant as she went to the plaintiff on it being reported and examined the floor. She did not see any wet area around the position of where the plaintiff was but did not bend down to feel the ground. Both sides had engineers giving evidence based on CCTV, but this did not assist the court in its net point in determining liability. The defendant queried the plaintiff’s high heels and put it to her that these heels might have contributed to her slipping, but the court was satisfied with her answer that she frequently wore high heels, and these did not cause her to slip. The defendant put it to the court that nobody else had issues with the floor; that on checking out of the hotel, the plaintiff did not complain about the fall and the absence of mentioning the wet floor in her solicitor’s original letter not in the ambulance record of the incident. However, on the balance of the evidence, the court was persuaded by the plaintiff’s evidence and found the hotel was liable for the accident. Having decided on liability, the court addressed the amount of damages and awarded a total of €72,000, for pain and suffering to date. Kirby v Hotel Kilkenny Ltd High Court (O’Connor J) 30 April 2025; [IEHC] 305.

Following her birth, a pair of pants was bought for the infant plaintiff in Brown Thomas’s store in Dublin. On a family holiday about 10 weeks later, she was dressed in a combination of pink dress and pants. After a few hours wearing this the baby became very agitated. Later when the baby was being prepared for bed that evening, her mother noticed red marks on the baby’s outer thighs. After the holiday, her mother brought her baby to her doctor and after examination, the doctor referred her to a consultant plastic and reconstructive surgeon. Photographs of the baby’s injuries were taken at the time of the injury and later for production to the court. The sequence of photographs showed the marks on the baby took two and a half years to fully clear up. An expert witness had examined the pants in 2012 and found that the elastic was twice as powerful as he would recommend even for an adult. The plastic surgeon had found residual scarring on the baby’s outer thighs and ‘’secondary to a tight constriction band in the area where an elasticated baby-gro might fit against a baby’s skin.” The surgeon’s report noted the only treatment required for the injuries was massage with Bio oil by the baby’s mother. Three years after the incident the surgeon noted there were no marks and no need for any treatment. The defendants, Ralph Lauren Ireland Ltd had delivered a full defence but a settlement offer of €17,500 had been made and the President of the Circuit Court, Mr. Justice Raymond Groarke, who was presiding, approved it and awarded the plaintiff costs. Amelia Duhy (Suing by her Mother, Julie Duhy) v Ralph Lauren Ireland Limited Circuit Court (Mr. Justice Raymond Groarke) 23 February 2016.

A shareholder’s agreement is a useful document to have especially when there are a number of shareholders. The main purpose of it is to regulate the relationship between shareholders, the company, and potentially the company's management, ensuring that all parties are aware of their roles and how the company will be governed. In essence the shareholders’ agreement is a contract and like all contracts it creates rights and obligations for shareholders beyond the basic rights in company law or in a company’s constitution. The parties to a shareholders’ agreement may be all the company’s shareholders or just some of them. But it is useful to have in place for new shareholders. Careful consideration needs to be given to its clauses. Your solicitor will guide you through these. Such agreements deal with the issue and sale/transfer of shares, the composition of the board of directors and appointment of new directors, how it deals with minority shareholders and their rights, restrictive covenants and options to resolve disputes. It is open to the directors creating a shareholder’s agreement to include or exclude clauses they want or do not want. In addition, a company can have more than one shareholder’s agreement in place at the same time but to avoid conflict one agreement is preferable. Having in place a shareholder’s agreement is a faster way of resolving disputes among shareholders. Some common issues that can create shareholder issues: How dividends are to be paid & when paid In family businesses disputes can easily arise, these can be more personal than to do with the company Selling shares Amending the company’s constitution Appointing new directors A shareholder’s agreement will cover all the contingencies that can arise in a business. Not all will be relevant to your business so your solicitor will guide you in choosing the clauses best suited to your business. A shareholder’s agreement can be terminated in a few ways, including by mutual agreement of the shareholders, by a specified event in the agreement, or by the company's dissolution. The agreement should outline the specific circumstances and procedures for termination. 

A pre-nuptial agreement is an agreement made between two people who intend to marry each other. The agreement can cover a number of issues including the parties’ assets and arrangements in the event of the marriage breaking down regarding the custody and welfare of children they may have and even pets they may acquire. In Ireland, strangely enough, these agreements are not legally binding. They are then a statement of the parties’ intentions at the time they got married and if they end up in court, a judge is not bound by the terms of the agreement. However, there is a provision under the Succession Act, 1965 (section 113) where a spouse or civil partner can renounce his or her legal right in a pre-nuptial agreement and this does have legal effect. Like any important document it is wise to take legal advice on drafting a pre-nuptial agreement. Openness and honesty are required when disclosing what assets the parties may have before they entered the agreement. Holding back the disclosure of money, property, or other assets, defeats its purpose. Form of the Agreement While there is no definitive rule, it should be in writing. As it is in fact a contract between two parties, it should be signed by both parties, dated, and ideally witnessed. There is nothing against updating a pre-nuptial agreement and where the circumstances change of one or indeed both parties, it might be a good idea to update it to cater for the new situation. Cohabitation Agreements This has legislative protection under the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010 . This permits cohabitants to enter into a cohabitants’ agreement regarding financial matters during their time together. There is a provision in the Act requiring that either the couple obtained independent legal advice or that they obtained legal advice together and waived, in writing, the right to independent legal advice. Here also, the agreement must be in writing, dated and signed by both parties. 

ViberStore Group, a small Irish phone recycling retailer and supplier company, sought to register the trademark ViberStore but the application was challenged by Viber, a company owned by Japanese giant Rakuten. The dispute which came before the Controller of Intellectual Property centred around the name ‘viber’ and whether its usage by the applicant Irish company would cause confusion in the market. Viber, in opposing the trademark, claimed that the Irish company’s logo was similar to their company’s registered trademarks. It claimed the phone services of the Irish company were similar enough to the services they provided to cause confusion among the public as to whether the two companies were associated. They accused ViberStore of ‘passing off’ and in their submission called on the Controller to reject the Irish company application to register the trademark ‘ViberStore.’ They pressed the point that consumers would likely be confused between the two companies and could think the two companies were associated, which they were not. Viberstore group rejected the complaints made by the Japanese-owned company. It said that while ten years ago their service had widespread usage that since the arrival of WhatsApp, its market had been taken over. They rejected the argument that there would be confusion among consumers in the two names. The Controller in his ruling found that ViberStore was trying to take unfair advantage of the Viber trademark, but he found that the Irish company were not "passing off" their services with those their competitor. In rejecting ViberStore’s application for their trademark, the Controller said: ‘the re is a real likelihood that a consumer, who had used [Viber’s] goods or services or who had an awareness of them, would, when encountering the applicant’s mark, be liable to be confused or be led to believe that the applicant’s mark is associated with those of the opponent’s’. He went on to say that there was a ‘ high level of similarity’ between the two marks and a similarity in respect of the services. The ViberStore Group Limited (applicant) v Viber Media S.à r.l. (opponent) No. 263638 Controller of Intellectual Property (John Nolan) 10 April 2025.