While the subject matter of the case involved a personal injury which the plaintiff incurred when being pushed from behind while descending a staircase in the defendant’s school, the application before the court was to dismiss the case on account of prolonged delay by the plaintiff in pursuing the case.
Because of the delay, the defendant had previously sought to have the case dismissed. This case was Neiser v. Leinster Senior College, unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 29 June 2023. Mr Justice Phelan dismissed the motion to dismiss the case relying on the decision in Primor plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459.
He cited from that judgment which said in part: ‘I refuse to make an order dismissing the plaintiff’s proceedings on grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay being satisfied that this delay has not so prejudiced the defendant as to tip the balance of justice against allowing the case to proceed.’
Phelan J expressly stated that there was an “imperative” for steps to be taken, without any further delay, to secure a hearing date for these proceedings. As of the date of the judgment, the only procedural step remaining to be completed in order to obtain a hearing date was to make an application to the judge in charge of the Personal Injuries List. Nothing else was outstanding. The pleadings were long since closed and the discovery process completed.
However, the plaintiff’s side failed to apply for a date, despite numerous requests that they do so.
The plaintiff’s solicitors filed to come off record, but this was not followed through and the plaintiff's solicitor admitted that there was delay by his firm in processing the case which was not the plaintiff’s fault.
The solicitor acknowledged that the plaintiff had been given a “clear warning” by the court that there should be no further delay in obtaining a hearing date and that the plaintiff and her solicitors have not complied with that warning.
The principles governing applications to dismiss proceedings on the grounds of delay have recently been restated by the Supreme Court in Kirwan v. Connors [2025] IESC 21. The following points are of especial relevance to the circumstances of the present proceedings.
First, the law should recognise the fact that passage of time is important in and of itself, and can justify dismissal of a claim, without more justification.
Second, there is no mutual obligation in litigation requiring defendants to take positive steps to advance a case brought against them. Defendant inactivity is not normally a bar to dismissal.
Third, rules on dismissal of claims for want of prosecution are not themselves an impermissible interference with the right of access to courts to litigate claims and there is no presumption against dismissal.
Fourth, if a court does not dismiss the claim, it would be entitled to make strict case management directions on the basis that non-compliance with such directions would itself justify dismissal.
In the current application to dismiss the proceedings, Simons J observed that the judgment of Phelan J of 29 June 2023 was that the refusal of the application was contingent on steps being taken without any further delay to secure a hearing date for the proceedings. These steps had not been taken.
In seeking to dismiss the motion to terminate the action because of inordinate delay, counsel for the plaintiff submitted nevertheless that there were exceptional circumstances which justified further indulgence. First, it was said that the plaintiff is unemployed and suffers financial hardship. Second, it was said that the plaintiff suffers from depression and ill-health caused by the alleged incident. This, it was said, has led to difficulties in obtaining instructions from the plaintiff. Simons J rejected all three grounds and said:
‘The plaintiff has failed to establish that there are any exceptional circumstances which might justify the delay from June 2023 in having a hearing date fixed. As explained in Kirwan v. Connors (per O’Donnell C.J.) a court, in deciding not to dismiss a claim, is entitled to make strict case management directions on the basis that non-compliance with such directions would itself justify dismissal. Here, the High Court, in its judgment of 29 June 2023, made it plain that steps were to be taken “without any further delay” to secure a hearing date for the proceedings. This imperative has not been complied with and there is no justification for this non-compliance. It follows, therefore, that the proceedings must be dismissed by reason of delay.’
The application to dismiss the personal injury proceedings because of delay was granted.
Neiser v Leinster Senior College Ltd and Idemudia Akpekpe (third party) High Court (Simons J) [2026] IEHC 15

