The plaintiff had bought some land that was adjacent to the defendant. There was a laneway leading to his land and the defendant was not happy with the use of it by the plaintiff. On the day of the incident, the plaintiff was driving up the laneway but was obstructed by the defendant and his son. The plaintiff tried to go past them, but they blocked him. He said the defendant threatened and verbally abused him and demanded that the plaintiff get off the laneway. The plaintiff explained to the court that the situation became extremely volatile. The defendant did not appear at the hearing. Previously he was charged and convicted, on a guilty plea, for the firearm offences of possession of a firearm without a certificate and assault causing harm for which he received a three-year suspended sentence. The plaintiff said in evidence that the defendant fired several shots from a shotgun at him. The pellets smashed the windows of the digger. He was hit by several of the pellets. One lodged in his eye, and he subsequently lost consciousness. He said the experience terrified him and he was in fear for both his own life and that of a friend who was travelling a short distance behind him. In total 14 pellets were embedded in his face. The result of the incident caused the plaintiff to lose interest in his farming work, become withdrawn and isolated. Fortunately, he obtained medical assistance and after two years was much improved. The court award the plaintiff a total of €128,000 which included €30,000 for exemplary and aggravated damages. Sweeney v Friel High Court [2025] IEHC 716

What is a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO)? A CPO is a legal order which allows certain statutory bodies, such as local authorities, which need to acquire land or property for large projects (e.g. road widening or Luas schemes) to do so without the consent of the owner where a compelling case in the public interest can be demonstrated. Compulsory purchase powers enable a local authority to acquire land, property, and other interests compulsorily to carry out their public function. What is the Purpose of a Compulsory Purchase and owner Compensation? The compulsory acquisition of land takes place in Ireland to allow a public infrastructure project, perhaps to support new housing, to go ahead for the common good. The principle of compulsory purchase compensation is to seek to place the affected party, in so far as money can, in no better or worse position than they were prior to the compulsory purchase. What are the Steps of a CPO Process? A statutory body decides to make a CPO. Affected parties will be served with a notice stating that the Order is about to be put on public display and submitted to An Coimisiun Pleanála for confirmation. Newspaper notices will be published. Objections/submissions can be made to An Coimisium Pleanála, and this may result in an Oral Hearing at which affected parties can formally put their views forward. An Coimisium Pleanála either confirms, amends or rejects CPO order and publishes details of the decisions in this regard. After expiry of objection period, the CPO is operative. Local Authority serves Notice to Treat on the affected parties and discussions commence regarding the level of compensation available. The affected party lodges a claim for compensation. This can be made by the claimants’ valuer. On reaching agreement, compensation is paid, otherwise the matter may be referred by either party to the Property Arbitrator to assess compensation. Acquisition is finalised, compensation paid. How do I know when a CPO application has been made affecting my property? If your property or portion of it is to be the subject of a CPO, you will receive a letter notifying you that an application has been made and of the timeframe available to you to make submissions (representations) to the relevant planning authority. Can I object to the making of a CPO? You certainly can. Once a CPO application is made to the relevant planning authority there is a statutory consultation process during which time submissions and objections to the CPO can be made to the local authority. In most instances for large infrastructure projects, the decision-making authority is An Coimisium Pleanála. What is a Notice to Treat? The Notice to Treat is a formal request served by the local authority to agree a price for the portion of land or property identified for CPO. It states that the acquiring authority is willing to treat or make an offer to purchase the owner, lessee and occupiers' interest in the land and invites affected parties to submit details of their claim. The Notice to Treat is not considered a binding contract and does not in itself have the effect of passing any interest or estate in land to the acquiring authority. The transfer of legal interest(s) in lands occurs at a later stage when your solicitor completes the title transfer to the local authority. The original Notice to Treat must be served on the named person. A copy can be sent to a representative where requested. What is a Notice of Entry? A Notice of Entry is a formal legal notice which is served by the local authority either at the same time or following the service of a Notice to Treat and gives the acquiring authority power to enter on and take possession of the relevant lands to be acquired. This may occur before compensation is agreed and before money has been paid. The affected party/interest is given a minimum of 14 days’ prior notice and typically access is arranged between your solicitor and the other parties by agreement. How can I prepare a Compensation Claim? Upon receipt of a Notice to Treat, a claimant’s legal duty to engage starts. The claimant may wish to obtain independent professional advice and representation in preparing and negotiating a claim for compensation. The cost of such services is part of a normal claim for compensation and is typically made up as follows: Solicitor’s costs for conveyancing and advice on the CPO process. Valuer’s / Agronomists fees to cover negotiations on compensation. Other professional fees associated with the CPO. Who can I contact to Prepare my Claim? There are several professional representative bodies where some of their members practice in the area of compulsory purchase and compensation. These include the Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (SCSI); Institute of Professional Auctioneers & Valuers (IPAV); Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS); Agricultural; Consultants Association (ACA); and the Law Society. How is the Compensation Assessed? Where the entitlement to statutory compensation exists, each case is assessed on its own merits. The usual rule is that you are compensated for the value of the lands taken by the local authority along with any loss of value in the lands retained caused by the CPO. How do Negotiations Happen? When the compensation claim has been submitted, it is normal for negotiations to take place between the valuers appointed to act on behalf of the local authority and the owners’ valuer. During those Negotiations, an agreement on compensation can be reached with an extensive list of accommodation works i.e. fencing, walls, water supply, drainage, relocation of septic tank, double glazing etc. Sometimes a monetary contribution can be agreed in lieu of the provision of those works items. Otherwise, the accommodation works will generally be completed prior to or during the main construction contract. Yes, but what if Compensation Is not Agreed? Where it is not possible for the claimant and the local authority to reach agreement on the compensation payable, the law provides for an independent arbitration process whereby an arbitrator, after hearing the evidence from the respective parties determines the amount payable. The decision of an arbitrator is binding on both parties. Either the owner or the local authority can apply for the appointment of a property arbitrator. When do I receive my Compensation? Once the negotiations process is complete and a proposed settlement is reached between the parties, or following an Award from the property arbitrator, the matter is referred to each side’s respective legal representatives to undertake the conveyancing (transfer of ownership) process and then the compensation is paid. It is important that your solicitor ensures that your legal title documentation is in order as only good and marketable title is acceptable to the local authority. Difficulties in payment of compensation may arise if clear title or ownership details cannot be confirmed by your solicitor. The CPO process can be long and somewhat complex. It is in your own interests to engage with your solicitor and valuer at the earliest possible stage to ensure the best outcome for you as an owner.

The petitioner who is a director and shareholder in software company Sulu Software Consultancy Ltd, sought to wind up the company pursuant to the Companies Act, 2014, section 569 (1) (e) on the grounds that the Company has, due to a breakdown in the relationship with one of the founders, essentially ceased to function and is on the cusp of insolvency. The respondent objected to the application to wind up the company. He was also a director of the Company and, at the time the petition was presented, a shareholder, holding just over 25% of the issued share capital of the Company. At the time the application to the court was made, the company was on the brink of insolvency, with no employees and very little activity happening. The application to the court was for the court to exercise its discretion on the ‘just and equitable’ ground on arguments put forward by the respondent. The grounds put forward by the respondent were: (i) The petitioner had organised the acquisition of the respondents shares in the company after the respondent had resigned. (ii) The petitioner was part of a plan to remove the non-compete clauses from the contracts of employment of key staff, which was proposed and supported by all the shareholders, except for the respondent; and (iii) The petitioner had started to work on a new startup company which did not include the respondent. Also, the respondent urged that the real purpose of the petition was to frustrate his proposed Oppression Proceedings and the Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the winding-up petition in all the circumstances. The petitioner and respondent were founders of the company which was to design software to help companies leverage the benefits of using crypto currency and associated technology. There was no dispute that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the relationship between the respondent and the company. Both parties agreed that the company was on the brink of insolvency. The petitioner explained to the court that the company was a start-up with start-up funding which was virtually gone and the Oppression Proceedings by the respondent made it almost impossible to attract new investment. As a result of that, the company passed a resolution supported by all of the shareholders except the respondent, releasing all of the founders, including the respondent, from their non-compete clauses. The Board Minutes in respect of that decision indicated that it arose in “consideration of the financial position and poor future prospects of the Company.” The court considered the legislative provisions under the Companies Act, 2014 and relevant case law. Very extensive submissions were made by both sides and in considering these together with the legislation and case law, the court was satisfied that the appropriate exercise of the court's discretion was to accede to the petition and to make an order for the winding up of the Company and the appointment of the liquidator. Having considered the factual context and having taken account of the submissions made, the court ruled that it was just and equitable that the company be wound up. Mr Justice Quinn said: ‘The principal reason for this is the undisputed fact that the company is on the cusp of insolvency and has literally only months to go before it runs out of funds and there is no plausible prospect of this not occurring. No solution has been identified that will enable the Company to avoid an imminent insolvency. As Collins J. says in Re Lanskey Ltd. [2022] IECA 34 “there was no adequate or satisfactory alternative remedy here”. To refuse the petition would be to create an unsatisfactory situation. The Company has currently no employees and is carrying on minimal activity. In a few months, the Company will be insolvent with no cash or other assets, and it will be difficult, from a practical point of view, for any liquidator to carry out the functions necessary to wind up the Company properly.’ The judge observed that without investment the company could not fulfil the purpose for which it was created. In all the circumstances, the court found that it was just and equitable to have the company wound up. O’Neill (petitioner) v Hudner (respondent) High Court [2025] IEHC 669.

The plaintiff went to Tallaght University Hospital A&E on 8 August 2020 complaining of a severe headache and said he had headaches over a 10-day period. Three days after attending the hospital, he collapsed from a brain bleed. Counsel for the plaintiff told the court that while at the hospital the plaintiff received a cursory examination and was then discharged but three days later, he collapsed at his home. It was submitted that the plaintiff suffered a very bad bleed in the brain and it was his side’s contention that a CT brain scan should have been carried out on the August visit to the hospital emergency department. Counsel submitted that a scan may have shown traces of blood cell breakdown and he could have had a lumbar puncture and been transferred to another hospital for treatment. It was claimed that there was an alleged failure to take any reasonable or appropriate care of the plaintiff when he attended the A&E of Tallaght University Hospital in August 2020. It was further claimed there was an alleged failure to properly examine, investigate and treat him in a timely manner. It was also claimed there was an alleged failure to give sufficient attention to his presentation and complaints of changed and increased frequency, intensity, and severity of headaches. It was further contended that the plaintiff’s complaints were allegedly inappropriately and erroneously attributed to his longstanding migraine. There was, it was claimed, an alleged failure to investigate Mr Cully’s headaches with neurological examination in a timely manner. Counsel for the hospital responded saying that liability was hotly contested in the case and the big issue was the contention by the defendant that the CT scan imaging should have been performed during the A&E visit. Counsel for the hospital further submitted that it was the hospital’s case that had a CT brain scan been performed on the August visit to the emergency department, it would not have shown a brain bleed and could have been falsely reassuring. The hospital contended that it was unlikely the plaintiff suffered a brain bleed before August 11, when he collapsed at home. All the claims were denied, and it was contended by the hospital that the plaintiff received reasonable and appropriate care when he attended the emergency department of Tallaght University Hospital on 8 August 2020. It was further contended that the typical features of a brain bleed were absent, and it was contended that it was reasonable to attribute Mr Cully’s symptoms to a longstanding migraine history and the symptoms complained of were more in keeping with migraine. The plaintiff, the hospital claimed, was given appropriate advice, treatment, and care for the presenting complaint. During a break, the two sides reached a settlement which was read to the judge for approval. The judge agreed on the division of liability of two thirds against the plaintiff and one third against the hospital amounting to a settlement figure of €1m. Cully v Tallaght University Hospital High Court (Mr Justice Paul Coffey) 9 December 2025.

KBC bank sold on a loan to Pepper Finance after it started possession proceedings against the borrower. But did Pepper follow the correct procedures in setting itself up as the new plaintiff? Borrowers in recent years became used to receiving letters from their lender informing them that their loans have been acquired by a new entity to whom they should make future payments. A common term for these new entities is vulture funds and they are not slow in taking action against defaulting borrowers through the courts. However, sometimes the new vulture fund might purchase a loan book some time after the vendor/bank had actually issued proceedings against the borrower and even obtained judgement. A borrower was entitled to appeal a possession judgment to the High Court but in that case, it became necessary for the new vulture fund to have itself substituted, as it were, for the original bank plaintiff in the appeal proceedings. A recent case in the High Court highlighted that there was some legal uncertainty about the exact procedures for inserting the new vulture fund plaintiff in such proceedings and the judge remitted the issue on to the Court of Appeal for them to determine. If the new plaintiff was incorrectly inserted into the proceedings, it followed that any resultant orders could be challenged and maybe null and void. Historically, the vulture funds had applied to the courts to have themselves substituted as a new plaintiff in place of the old bank plaintiff. However, the judge queried this and quoted an earlier high court case IRBC v Halpin which suggested that in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the correct order to be made (where a transfer of loan has occurred between the Circuit Court case and the hearing of an appeal) is that the new vulture fund transferee be joined as an additional party to the appeal proceedings as a second plaintiff rather than merely stepping into the shoes of or being substituted for the original plaintiff. A substitution order made midway through an appeal has the effect the judge said of appearing to give retrospective judgement to the newly added party and that would not be correct. He therefore sent the issue of the precise form a change of party application should take on to the Court of Appeal to determine Pepper Finance Corporation Ireland DAC v Treacey O’Neill [2024] IEHC 742

A passenger on a boat that encountered a rough sea crossing sued Irish Ferries for the trauma she suffered from the experience. The plaintiff, Susan Burt, described the sea journey as a ‘hideous and harrowing experience,’ on the sea crossing. She told the court that she thought that she was going to die when the boat was tossed around. At one point the boat lurched to an angle of 33 degrees during Storm Imogen about 10 years ago when the boat was sailing between Cherbourg and Dublin. The court was told that conditions were so bad that the boat could not drop anchor or risk docking anywhere. Instead, it had to sail back and forth for 18 hours in what coastal shelter it could find until the storm eased. The court was told that passengers were screaming with the extreme sailing conditions. Items were dismantled and flying through the air, dishes were smashing, furniture was sliding up and down decks and cabin floors and when the ship rolled, passengers had to crawl on all fours to get around. The plaintiff thought, as did others, that the ship might capsize. Previous claims by some passengers were settled for between €14,500 and €23,000 for what they endured and some of these were awarded to children. His Honour Judge Callan considered the mental trauma suffered by the plaintiff in considering the level of damages. He noted that the plaintiff had not reached the threshold of having suffered PTSD according to psychiatric reports though she had been exposed to sustained and continuous shock, an experience that she should not have had to endure. Considering all the facts, the judge awarded €17,500 in damages to the plaintiff. The case was taken in the Circuit Court and as the award was below the threshold for damages in that court, the barrister for Irish Ferries asked the court to award legal costs on the District Court scale. The judge declined and awarded costs on the Circuit Court scale because the proceedings had been ongoing for a considerable time and the court was impressed with the evidence of the plaintiff. Susan Burt v Irish Ferries Circuit Civil Court (His Hon. Judge Chris Callan) 27 June 2025.

Following an accident, you should equip your solicitor with all documents and details necessary for him to get an overview of the facts and decide as to who is liable for the accident. He/she will then be able to commence a claim on your behalf. Do I have to go to the PIAB? You are obliged to engage with the Injuries Board in most personal injury cases but, in medical negligence cases, you can bypass the Injuries Board and issue proceedings directly in the courts. You have two years to initiate such proceedings, and this time limit is a strict one unless you only realised you had an injury or condition (caused by medical negligence) outside the two-year time limit. Settlement or court hearing? Most claims, even after proceedings are well underway, are settled out of court and without any need to go to trial. Some cases, (perhaps those lacking in merit) will be fully defended by the insurance company and are more likely, following the breakdown of settlement discussions to end up in a full court hearing. What happens in the courtroom itself? Your team, as plaintiff, will start off outlining the case to the judge and the other side, the defendant/insurance company, will have a right of reply. The judge will hear evidence from the plaintiff and the medical expert opinion witnesses. Again, the defendant can challenge some of their comments by way of cross-examination and produce their own expert independent witnesses. The judge then sums up and largely based on the medical reports, will find in favour of the plaintiff or defendant as the case may. I am a somewhat nervous person. Do I have to spend lots of time in court describing my injuries? No. You will not spend hours in the witness box describing your medical injuries as your medical witnesses will do this for you. You will merely be asked to say that you were unwell and therefore relied on your surgeon/GP/physician to treat you properly and adequately. Do I have to agree to go to mediation as I really want my day in court? The short answer is no but you would be well advised to consider mediation as an alternative to court hearings which will be more daunting and expensive. For some years the courts have tried to encourage all parties in the more complex personal injury actions to consider going to mediation. Quite recently the courts issued a practice direction bracket (HC131) to all legal practitioners whereby the plaintiff’s team must formally offer mediation to the opposing party within three weeks of obtaining a trial date and agree to engage in that mediation process within six weeks of their offer being accepted.

The plaintiff’s car was rear-ended in a motor accident at traffic lights where the defendant insurer had accepted liability. The accident occurred in December 2017. Her case came before the High Court on an assessment-only basis. However, a question arose as to whether the defendant could be held liable for PTSD which was alleged to have resulted from the accident. If that was the case, then to what extent to which the plaintiff’s ongoing physical and psychological symptoms were properly referable to the accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was wearing her seat belt, but the air bags did not deploy. Later that day, she felt unwell and attended CareDoc. From here she was referred to hospital where she was diagnosed with soft tissue issues to her neck, shoulder and right arm. The plaintiff claimed that she took seven weeks’ sick leave from her job but on her return, she claimed that she found it difficult because of her injuries. She also claimed that she suffered anxiety, flashbacks and had difficulty sleeping. At the end of December 2021 her employment was terminated and from September 2022 she started to receive an invalidity pension. She has not worked since, and she and her daughter became homeless in March 2023. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had some personal difficulties. Her parents died and she had to take medication to cope with difficulties she had with a work colleague. However, she accepted that at the time of the accident she was not experiencing any mental health issues. The defendant insurer had accepted liability. However, a question arose as to whether the defendant could be held liable for PTSD alleged to have resulted from the accident and if so, the extent to which the plaintiff’s ongoing physical and psychological symptoms were properly referable to the accident. It was submitted by the defendant that the accident was not the cause of the plaintiff’s mental health. The defendant argued that the accident was not causative of the plaintiff’s mental health problems and that same were in existence at the time of the accident, relying on the fact that the claim was introduced very belatedly into the plaintiff’s case and that she improperly failed to disclose relevant prior mental health history until shortly before the hearing. The judge was not impressed with the plaintiff’s failure to disclose her prior mental health issues and that she was inclined to overstate her symptoms. However, the judge noted that: “even allowing for a margin of exaggeration by the plaintiff of her symptoms”, he was satisfied from the medical evidence tendered that the plaintiff was no longer suffering from anxiety and depression at the time of the accident. The judge commented that the plaintiff was a poor candidate for the accident because of her psychological vulnerability, the “eggshell skull” rule required the defendant to take the plaintiff as he found her. Nervous shock was considered in light of Kelly v Hennessy [1995] 3 IR 253, and the judge was satisfied that the plaintiff met its requirements. The judge explained that some sort of injury was foreseeable arising from the accident. With causation established, the plaintiff would not have suffered symptoms consistent with PTSD from January 2018 onwards but for the accident, but that a range of external factors not properly referable to the accident contributed to the length and severity of her mental health symptoms. In other words, the external facts were a consideration of the plaintiff’s mental heal but not directly caused by the car accident. Accordingly, the court concluded that damages would fall to be assessed on the basis that 50% of the plaintiff’s psychiatric symptoms in the period from the accident to trial were attributable to the accident itself. Having regard to the relevant case law on the principles applying to awards of damages in personal injuries cases and on the approach to multiple injuries cases, the judge determined that the plaintiff’s psychiatric injury was the most significant and assessed damages on a “pre-Guidelines basis” at €50,000 for past suffering and €10,000 for future suffering. Having discounted that figure to €30,000 to take into account the contributing and exacerbating external factors not attributable to the accident, the court uplifted that figure by €35,000 for the plaintiff’s neck, shoulder and back injuries. Therefore, the High Court awarded the plaintiff €65,000 in general damages, together with special damages and loss of earnings already agreed at €25,000. Sykula v O’Reilly [2025] IEHC 638.

A case came before the High Court where it appeared that an alteration was made to a Will after it had been executed. The deceased man had died, leaving four siblings as he had never married and had no children. In his Will dated 29 April 1981, he left a valuable property in Dublin to one of his brothers, Eamonn. A later alteration to the Will replaced the bequest of the property to his brother, Eamon with a bequest of IR €1 (pound). Another brother of the deceased, Malachy sought an order of the court for a grant of probate and an order declaring that the Will was duly executed. The judge noted that if the attempted obliteration of the bequest was found to be valid and effective, the deceased’s three surviving siblings and the children of a sibling who predeceased the testator would be entitled to shares of the property. The judge was satisfied that the Will was correctly executed and, having done so, now needed to address the part of the Will that bequeathed the property to one of the deceased’s brothers. The judge considered section 86 of the 1965 Act which invalidates obliterations, interlineations or alterations to a Will if made after execution unless they are executed in like manner as the will itself, the court highlighted: “This is so even if the words are not only no longer ‘apparent’ but cannot be deciphered even with the aid of infrared technology. A conundrum can therefore arise if there is an invalid obliteration of part of a Will and it is not possible, even with the aid of technology, to decipher what the terms of the will are.” The judge found that in circumstances where the obliterated words in the deceased’s Will were still legible, “it is clear that this Will has not been partially revoked so as to remove the bequest in favour of Eamonn” and that there was no evidence whatsoever to support any finding of an intention to revoke that part of the Will. The judge pointed out that if the changes were made prior to the Will being executed, then that would be fine. It was submitted to the court that the deceased’s brother Tom came into possession of the Will on a date prior to August 2009 and that the applicant came into possession of the will on 12 August 2009 and accepted that the Will had not been opened or altered between 12 August 2009 and the date of the deceased’s death. However, the judge noted that that left a gap of 28 years wherein an alteration to the Will could have been made. The judge was of the opinion that it was more likely that the change of heart came after execution of the Will, noting that it could not be said whether the attempted obliteration and alterations were done by the testator in any event as there was no acknowledgment of the changes by him or by any witnesses and so section 86 had not been complied with. Therefore, the High Court ruled the changes made to the Will in respect of the property to be invalid and admitted the Will to probate so as to include the words “160 S.C. Road, Dublin” and determined that the characters “£1-00” would be excluded from the Will as their insertion was not validly and effectively done. In the matter of the Estate of Michael Joseph McNally [2025] IEHC 299.